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The findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in the report are those of the 
University of Strathclyde, Department of Management Science 
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Historical Exploration - Learning Lessons from 
the Past to Inform the Future  
Tim Bedford1, John Quigley, Matthew Revie and Lesley Walls 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This report examines a number of exploration campaigns that have taken place 
during the last 700 years, and considers them from a risk perspective.  The 
explorations are those led by Christopher Columbus, Sir Walter Raleigh, John 
Franklin, Sir Ernest Shackleton, the Company of Scotland to Darien and the 
Apollo project undertaken by NASA. To provide a wider context for investigating 
the selected exploration campaigns, we seek ways of finding analogies at 
mission, programmatic and strategic levels and thereby to develop common 
themes. Ultimately, the purpose of the study is to understand how risk has 
shaped past explorations, in order to learn lessons for the future. From this, we 
begin to identify and develop tools for assessing strategic risk in future 
explorations. 
Figure 0.1 (see Page 6) summarizes the key inputs used to shape the study, the 
process and the results, and provides a graphical overview of the methodology 
used in the project. The first step was to identify the potential cases that could be 
assessed and to create criteria for selection. These criteria were collaboratively 
developed through discussion with a Business Historian. From this, six cases 
were identified as meeting our key criteria. Preliminary analysis of two of the 
cases allowed us to develop an evaluation framework that was used across all 
six cases to ensure consistency. This framework was revised and developed 
further as all six cases were analyzed.  
A narrative and summary statistics were created for each exploration case 
studied, in addition to a method for visualizing the important dimensions that 
capture major events. These Risk Experience Diagrams illustrate how the 
realizations of events, linked to different types of risks, have influenced the 
historical development of each exploration campaign. From these diagrams, we 
can begin to compare risks across each of the cases using a common 
framework. In addition, exploration risks were classified in terms of mission, 
program and strategic risks. From this, a Venn diagram and Belief Network were 
developed to identify how different exploration risks interacted. These diagrams 
allow us to quickly view the key risk drivers and their interactions in each of the 
historical cases. 
                                               
1
  (Address for correspondence) Department of Management Science, Strathclyde Business School, 40, 
George St, Glasgow, G1 1QE, Scotland, UK. 
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By looking at the context in which individual missions take place we have been 
able to observe the dynamics within an exploration campaign, and gain an 
understanding of how these interact with influences from stakeholders and 
competitors. A qualitative model has been created to capture how these factors 
interact, and are further challenged by unwanted events such as mission failures 
and competitor successes. This Dynamic Systemic Risk Model is generic and 
applies broadly to all the exploration ventures studied. This model is an 
amalgamation of a System Dynamics model, hence incorporating the natural 
feedback loops within each exploration mission, and a risk model, in order to 
ensure that the unforeseen events that may occur can be incorporated into the 
modeling. 
Finally, an overview is given of the motivational drivers and summaries are 
presented of the overall costs borne in each exploration venture. An important 
observation is that all the cases – with the exception of Apollo – were failures in 
terms of meeting their original objectives. However, despite this, several were 
strategic successes and indeed changed goals as needed in an entrepreneurial 
way. The Risk Experience Diagrams developed for each case were used to 
quantitatively assess which risks were realized most often during our case 
studies and to draw comparisons at mission, program and strategic levels. In 
addition, using the Risk Experience Diagrams and the narrative of each case, 
specific lessons for future exploration were identified.   
 
There are three key conclusions to this study: 
Analyses of historical cases have shown that there exists a set of generic risk 
classes.  
This set of risk classes cover mission, program and strategic levels, and includes 
all the risks encountered in the cases studied. At mission level these are 
Leadership Decisions, Internal Events and External Events; at program level 
these are Lack of Learning, Resourcing and Mission Failure; at Strategic Level 
they are Programmatic Failure, Stakeholder Perception and Goal Change. In 
addition there are two further risks that impact at all levels: Self-Interest of 
Actors, and False Model. 
There is no reason to believe that these risk classes will not be applicable to 
future exploration and colonization campaigns.  
We have deliberately selected a range of different exploration and colonization 
campaigns, taking place between the 15th Century and the 20th Century. The 
generic risk framework is able to describe the significant types of risk for these 
missions. Furthermore, many of these risks relate to how human beings interact 
and learn lessons to guide their future behavior. Although we are better schooled 
than our forebears and are technically further advanced, there is no reason to 
think we are fundamentally better at identifying, prioritizing and controlling these 
classes of risk. 
Modern risk modeling techniques are capable of addressing mission and 
program risk but are not as well suited to strategic risk.  
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We have observed that strategic risks are prevalent throughout historic 
exploration and colonization campaigns. However, systematic approaches do not 
exist at the moment to analyze such risks.  
A risk-informed approach to understanding what happened in the past helps us 
guard against the danger of assuming that those events were inevitable, and 
highlights those chance events that produced the history that the world 
experienced.  In turn, it allows us to learn more clearly from the past about the 
way our modern risk modeling techniques might help us to manage the future – 
and also bring to light those areas where they may not. 
This study has been retrospective. Based on this analysis, the potential for 
developing the work in a prospective way by applying the risk models to future 
campaigns is discussed. Follow on work from this study will focus on creating a 
portfolio of tools for assessing strategic and programmatic risk. 
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Figure 0.1 – Overview of Methodology Flow Indicating Relationship between Tasks 
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1 Aims, Objectives and Scope 
The aim of this study is to explore the history of exploration from a risk 
perspective in order to gain an understanding of the ways in which risk has 
shaped past exploration and to understand how similar risks may shape future 
exploration.  
The objectives of this study are: 
 To describe the risk characteristics of a variety of historical cases which 
are selected to provide a representative cross-section of exploration 
characteristics; 
 To develop a unified risk typology to allow comparison of the costs, risks 
and benefits of exploration cases; 
 To examine the historical campaigns carried out in pursuit of an 
exploration goal to assess how risk impacts differently on the operation 
of the missions and programs as well as at the strategic level of the 
campaigns; 
 To investigate the relative success or failure of each mission and 
explore the primary conditions required in order to achieve exploration 
success; 
 To appreciate the context in which an exploration campaign took place 
to inform our understanding of the broad impact of external risks 
affecting the society‟s attitudes to exploration.  
A number of historical explorations are examined within the scope of this study.  
The cases have been selected to provide coverage of different periods of time 
and a variety of exploration characteristics, especially in terms of the mission 
goal. The cases selected represent mainly British, but also some European and 
a US exploration campaign, undertaken between the late 15th century and the 
20th century and together they represent the common motivations for exploration 
such as, for example, the expansion of scientific knowledge, the establishment 
of colonies, and the identification of trade routes to increase economic prosperity 
or the demonstration of political superiority.  
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2 Methodology and Process 
In this section we consider the process for selecting the cases which provide the 
data input to the analysis, and the methodological framework developed to 
support analysis of the case data. 
2.1 Criteria for Selection of Historical Cases  
In order to gain a richness of data and to capture trends through history, it was 
decided to use a selection of cases from early European exploration of the New 
World in the late 15th century to the Apollo missions of the 20th century. More 
importantly, however, this allows us to assess whether a framework could be 
formulated that could credibly encompass both early exploration and the current 
space exploration. 
In order to select cases within this frame of reference, a set of criteria were 
established informed by academic business historians2. The criteria are as 
follows: 
 Into the unknown - There exists a high degree of uncertainty in the 
outcome of the exploration arising because, for example, it is the first 
occasion in which humans, from the contemporary society 
commissioning the exploration, visited a new location or carried out a 
particular type of sortie;  
 Long term horizon - Individual missions last several years, and are part of 
a longer term program, which itself is part of a long term strategic 
campaign;  
 Discernable actors - There are key identifiable figures whose decisions, 
views, abilities and vision are drivers in the exploration story; 
 Competitive situation - There should be a prospect of gain or loss from 
the exploration, whether this is economic, defensive, political, or simply 
scientific;   
 Development of rules visible - There is a development of “rules of the 
game” through the exploration campaign, by which the relationships 
between explorers and other stakeholders, and the rights of explorers in 
particular, become formalized;  
 Availability of data - Data for the exploration is readily available. Note, 
however, that this research has largely restricted to secondary sources. 
 
 
 
                                               
2
 These criteria were developed post communications with Professor Charles Harvey, Dean Strathclyde 
Business School and Editor of the prestigious journal Business History. We would also like to 
acknowledge useful discussions with Professor Mark Casson, Professor of Economics at Reading 
University. 
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Six major cases were deemed to satisfy our criteria and have been selected for 
the study. These are the explorations led by Columbus, Raleigh, Franklin and 
Shackleton, the scheme to form a colony at Darien and the Apollo campaign.   
The positioning of these cases in calendar time and relative to the poles of 
exploration through colonization is shown in Figure 2.1. Note that a seventh 
case, Cabot, is considered in less detail (hence the reduced prominence in 
Figure 2.1) to provide a comparison with the Columbus case. 
In order to inform the development of the framework for analysis, two cases 
were selected for an initial pilot study - namely Darien and Apollo. These cases 
represent contrasting goals and calendar time, and hence provide a robust basis 
upon which to test and develop the methodology before implementation to all 
cases. The methodology was reviewed again after initial implementation on all 
cases, and further minor adjustments made. The evolution of the methodological 
framework is not discussed further, and only the mature version is used in the 
reported analysis.   
2.2 Framework for Analysis  
Figure 2.2 shows the framework for analysis. The preliminary analysis of the two 
pilot cases led us to develop a risk experience diagram to represent the key 
objectives, decisions and events extracted from the, usually extensive, narrative 
of the case materials and hence provide a summary characterization to better 
understand the risks. Two alternative representations of the risk classes have 
been developed. The simpler is a Venn diagram that represents the types of 
risks at different levels of the exploration - namely, mission, program and 
strategic risks, the latter being our terminology for the campaign level. The 
second is the belief network which aims to capture the influences between the 
Exploration
Colonization
Columbus
Raleigh
Darien
Franklin Apollo
Timeline
Future 
Exploration
ShackletonCabot
1492 1585 19611693 1819 1901
2008
Figure 2.1 – Cases studied identified by time and positioning of exploration and 
colonization goals 
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risks within and between each class. Together these three diagrammatic 
methods represent the framework for this study, which is used to analyze all six 
cases and also provides an output insofar as it can be used to support analysis 
of additional cases in future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The process of applying these methods was iterative.  As additional sources of 
material were read and an understanding of the issues developed, the analysis 
cycled through the stages of this framework. Through analysis of all cases, a 
model emerged for describing the dynamic relationship between the risks 
through time and between stages of the exploration. We name this a Dynamic 
Figure 2.2 – Overview of Methodology Flow Indicating Relationship between Tasks 
Columbus
Raleigh
Darien
Franklin
Shackleton
Apollo
Into the unknown
Long term horizon
Discernable actors 
Competitive situation
Development of rules visible 
Availability of data sources.
Create Selection 
Criteria
Columbus
Raleigh
Darien
Franklin
Shackleton
Apollo
Identify Appropriate 
Historical Cases
Columbus  Cook
Raleigh Magellan
Darien Drake
Franklin Vasco de Gama
Shackleton Cabot
Apollo Marco Polo
Literature Search of 
Possible Cases
Preliminary Analysis of 
Historical Cases
Discussion with Business 
History Expert
Create Risk Experience 
Diagram Template
Internal events
Leadership decisions
External events False model
Self-interest of actors
Mission Level
Stakeholder 
perception
Goal 
change
Programmatic 
failure
Strategic Level
Resourcing
Mission 
failure
Program Level
Lack of Learning
Create Venn Di gram
Program
Failure
Resources
Lack of 
Learning
Strategic
Failure
Goal 
Change
Stakeholder 
Perception
Mission 
Failure
Internal 
Events
External 
Events
Leadership 
Decisions
False 
Model
Self 
Interest of 
Actors
Create Belief 
Network
Analyse Historical 
Cases
Conclusions
Analysis of historical cases 
have shown that there exists 
a set of generic risk classes . 
Modern risk techniques 
address mission and 
program risk but are not 
well suited to strategic risk. 
To apply the risk classif ication template to NASA’s 
planned exploration campaigns to identify risks at 
program and strategic level.
To review previous work (arried out within NASA with 
regard to strategic risks
To identify potential control mechanisms operating at 
program and strategic level in order to gain an 
understanding of  how these might qualitatively affect 
the future course of  the campaign
To integrate the potential unwanted events and control 
mechanisms into a qualitative model and create 
qualitative scenarios for the future course of  the 
campaign. 
There is no reason to believe 
that they will not be applicable 
to future exploration and 
colonization campaigns. 
Future Work
“Unknown unknowns” can be converted to “known 
unknowns” by experience
Some unknown unknowns remain and can be mitigated 
by goal change
Goal changes are natural and be opportunistic
History judges by hindsight
Need to be wary of  decisions that restrict future goal 
change
Technology heavily inf luences goal setting and political 
agenda
Competition is principal driver for exploration
Lessons  Learnt for 
Future Exploration
Methodology
Output
Mission Failure Program Failure Strategic Failure
Internal 
Events
Leadership 
decisions
External 
Events
Lack of 
Learning
Resourcing Stake-
holder 
perception
Goal 
change
Self 
interest 
of actors
False 
model
Columbus 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 7 1
Raleigh 0 3 1 0 2 0 1 6 2
Darien 0 0 7 0 0 6 2 1 4
Franklin 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 0
Shackleton 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 4
Apollo 0 2 1 2 0 7 2 0 0
Total 3 9 10 6 2 17 11 18 11
Success
Failure
Failure
Failure
Failure
Failure
Failure
Program 
Outcome
Political
Scientific
Scientific
Political
Scientific
Prosperity
Prosperity
Political
Prosperity
Prosperity
Benefits
Fear to 
lose
Desire 
for gain
Desire 
for gain
Fear to 
lose
Fear to 
lose
Fear to 
Lose
Desire 
for gain
Driver
Failure
Failure
Success
Failure
Failure
Failure
Success
Strategic 
Outcome
4% of federal 
budget
Negligible
Negligible
25-50% GDP
£M 63 PV
~£35000
~£M 6.8 PV
Exploitation 
rights
Exploitation 
rights
£320,000 PV 
Exploitation 
rights
Estimated 
Cost
02811Shackleton
336112Apollo (1-17 
without 2 -6)
13413455Franklin 
(1845)
~2470~25001617Darien
Min. 
109 
226110Raleigh 
(Colonization)
??46Cabot
39~400513Columbus 
(Exploration)
No. of 
Peopl
e Lost
No. of 
People
No. of 
Ships 
Lost
No. of 
Ships 
Outward
Experience 
Crew
Reflection 
Crew
Expectations
Motivations 
Crew
Actions
+
Incentives
Programmatic 
Decision 
Making
Strategic 
Decision 
Making
Goals Motivation Key 
Stakeholders
Perception Key 
Stakeholders
Programmatic 
Reflection
Strategic 
Reflection
Assessment of 
Competition
Motivations of 
leadership
Perceptions of 
leaders
-
- -
-
Unwanted 
Event
Competitors 
Actions
-
-
-
Development of 
Dynamic Systemic 
Risk Model
Historical Exploration – Learning Lessons from the Past to Inform the Future                                       Bedford, Quigley, Revie and Walls 
 
 
Page 14                 
 
 
Systemic Risk Model because it captures not only the dynamic elements, but 
also the systemic aspects of risk, and facilitates deeper understanding of the 
controllable and uncontrollable factors affecting the chance of exploration 
success. We consider this model as the main methodological output of the 
study.   
Through application of the aforementioned methods and model, we are able to 
generate insights into the risk drivers and understand the issues that affected the 
success, or failure, of missions. Hence we are able to produce the output results 
of the study. 
Each of the method and model components of this framework is described in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
2.2.1 Risk Experience Diagram 
The pilot analysis led to the development of the „Risk Experience Diagram‟ – see 
Figure 2.3. This is a visual representation of key experiences emerging from the 
case narrative through calendar time. The purpose of the diagram is to 
summarize the main risk characteristics of a case in order to draw comparisons 
and identify trends. A prototype Risk Experience Diagram, created for the pilot 
cases, has been revised and improved for use with all six cases. 
Each experience is categorized into one of the following: objectives; decisions; 
stakeholder perception; events; and actions. These five categories allow us to 
capture the rich case history in terms of the objectives of each stage of the 
exploration; the decisions taken; the perception of stakeholders; the internal or 
external events impacting the exploration; and the actions of competitors, crew 
and other actors. The text boxes provide a description of the identified 
experience for a given case, although they are empty in the generic diagram in 
Figure 2.3. For events and actions, a solid box represents an internal experience 
whilst a dotted-line box represents an external experience. A solid directed line 
between boxes shows the relationship of one experience upon another. A 
dashed line represents the relationship between an experience (tail of arrow) 
that mitigated against a risk (head of arrow). The lines are also color coded 
according to the level of the risk in terms of its impact on the mission (red line), 
program (green line) or strategic level (blue line). If a risk encompasses more 
than one level, it is represented by a black line.  
Although there are multiple actors involved in making decisions and taking 
actions – see Table 2.1 for list of the main types of actor – we do not distinguish 
between these explicitly within the diagram beyond including appropriate 
descriptions of the named actors within the experience text boxes. 
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Table 2.1 Description of Key Actors within Exploration 
Actor Description 
Leader The person, or group, who plays the leading role in defining and 
executing the exploration venture. 
Stakeholder Those who are engaged with the exploration venture but are not direct 
participants, for example investors, taxpayers. 
Participants Those who take part in the exploration venture, either directly or 
indirectly, for example as crew, colonists. 
Competitor Those aligned to a different economic, social or national group, who 
seek benefit from their own potential or actual expedition ventures. 
Figure 2.3 – Generic Risk Experience Diagram Capturing Key Elements of Case Studied 
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2.2.2  Venn Diagram of Risk Classes 
The constructed risk experience diagram represents the subjective analysis of 
the researchers based upon consideration of multiple sources of literature and 
secondary data for each case. From these diagrams it is possible to identify 
common types of risks at each level of the exploration campaign and indeed it is 
possible to quantify their occurrence for a given case and to classify them more 
generally. Figure 2.4 shows a Venn diagram representing the exploration risk 
classifications developed from the historical cases, while Table 2.2 provides a 
definition of each risk.  Note that “false model” and “self-interest of actors” are 
considered common to all three levels, hence they are shown at the intersection 
of the mission, program and strategy classes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Venn Diagram representing Exploration Risk Classes 
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Table 2.2 – Definitions of Risks Classes 
 
Risk Definition 
Leadership 
Decisions 
This relates to decisions by leaders which appear poor when judged 
with hindsight on the basis of the criteria apparently in use at the time, 
and where there are no significant external low probability events 
affecting the outcome. That is, they are decisions which are 
intrinsically poor rather than where the decision maker was unlucky.  
Internal 
Events 
Risks arising from internal planning and design problems, for example 
logistic support, whose failure would increase the probability of 
mission failure.   
External 
Events 
Risks arising from external factors, such as the environment, which 
are not predicted.   
Lack of 
Learning 
The ability to adapt and update one‟s model is crucial for success, 
hence the inability to do this, whether through lack of available data or 
through inability to use that data, is a potential risk.   
Resources Lack of provision for funds from the sponsors, or overuse of allocated 
resources. 
Goal Change The reformulation of goals, either through a re-prioritization of 
objectives or the introduction of new ones. This is considered a risk 
because it means that the original goals have been replaced with 
potential loss of investment aimed at that goal. However, with the 
benefit of hindsight, history may treat goal change as a positive 
outcome.  
Stakeholder 
Perception 
Stakeholders‟ views of the expedition venture may change through 
time and influence the willingness of those stakeholders to provide 
resources and act in its support.  
Self Interest 
of Actors 
The actions of actors who pursue their own direct (possibly short-term) 
objectives instead of those set by the leadership.     
False Model Misinterpretation of data through making a false set of assumptions, or 
a false model about the relationship between the data and reality.  
 
2.2.3 Belief Network for Relationship between Risks 
From the historical cases, it is clear that there exist influences between the risks 
within and between each class. Hence a natural extension of the Venn diagram 
is the construction of a belief network as shown in Figure 2.5. A belief diagram is 
built up from two elements – a node and an arc. A circular node represents an 
uncertain variable and the arc represents the dependency of one variable on 
another. For more information on belief networks, see Clemen (1991). Figure 2.5 
shows that internal events, external events and leadership decisions influence 
the chance of mission failure (or success), which in turn, along with resources 
and lack of learning, can influence the chance of program failure. The 
independent nodes, false model and self-interest of actors, may influence all 
other variables. 
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2.2.4 Concept of System Dynamics  
Since explorations evolve dynamically through time, the concepts of system 
dynamics can also inform our understanding of the relationships between risk 
variables through control mechanisms to help manage the behavior and actions 
of the actors. See Appendix 1 for a simple qualitative system dynamics example. 
For further reading on system dynamics, see Forrester (1961). 
We do not use System Dynamics modeling directly within this study. However 
the concepts as discussed above are used to inform our understanding of the 
dynamic nature of systemic risks inherent in an exploration and will be 
introduced within the analysis of relevant cases in Section 4.  A general version 
of a new “Dynamic Systemic Risk” model will be presented in Section 5. This 
model represents the methodological output of this study and is grounded in the 
case analyses. 
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Figure 2.5 – Belief Network of Risk Classes 
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2.2.5 Statistical Data and the Role of the GDP Deflator 
For each case, we gather and present a selection of relevant descriptive 
statistics. These include data regarding the number of ships, participants – both 
commissioned and surviving – as well as the costs of the exploration. Cost data 
gathered for each exploration are usually expressed in monetary value at the 
time of the campaign. In order to compare cases, it is necessary to adjust for 
inflation in prices, and hence costs, over time. There is no one standard 
approach to do this. We have chosen to use one common approach which 
involves removing the effect of inflation by converting the nominal monetary 
figure to a real figure using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator.   
The general reasoning behind the GDP deflator is as follows. Price changes vary 
from item to item. Hence to adjust for the effects of inflation we require a price 
index which is a weighted average of the price changes in various items. The 
ambiguity in the construction of a price index arises due to the weights applied to 
the various price changes. Different industrial sectors or individuals within an 
economy will experience different erosions of the spending power of their 
currency depending on the commodities they purchase.  The weight given to a 
commodity‟s price change within the GDP deflator is the percentage of 
importance in the total GDP, which is the total value of the goods and services 
produced by a nation within a year.  
To illustrate an alternative approach, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is 
constructed with weights reflecting a typical consumer‟s expenditure.  Table 2.3 
provides the UK GDP Deflator and the UK CPI for a selection of 4 different years 
within the time span of the selected exploration cases using 2006 as a base 
year.  The table shows that an item costing £100 in 2006 could be estimated to 
have cost £0.17 or £0.27 in 1300 depending upon the adjustment method 
chosen.  Where estimates for specific years are not available, then we 
approximate with linear interpolation.      
 
Table 2.3 - Example of Price Adjustment using GDP deflator and CPI for British £  
 
Year GDP Deflator CPI 
1300 0.17 0.27 
1688 0.60 0.68 
1759 0.71 0.78 
2006 100.00 100.00 
Source: www.measuringworth.com 
2.3 Summary 
In this section, the criteria for selecting the historical exploration cases have 
been explained and the framework for the subjective analysis has been 
described. In the following section, we discuss the application of the methods 
and present the values of the descriptive statistics for each of the 6 cases 
selected. 
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3. Summary Analysis of Individual Cases 
3.1 Generic Structure for Case Analysis 
Each historical case analyzed is presented using the following structure. A short 
summary will be given of the overall campaign. Next, the goal at the start of the 
campaign will be described both at a program level and at a strategic level. A 
short contextual description of the economic and political state of the sponsoring 
nation will be presented together with the conceptual plan behind the campaign. 
A description of each mission within the campaign and a discussion of the result 
of the overall campaign will follow. From this, selected summary statistics will be 
shown. Note that the detail and accuracy of the statistics presented tends to 
decrease as we move further back in time. Finally, an overview of the risk 
lessons learned from the case is discussed. At the end of each chapter, a list of 
the key references used throughout each narrative is given. 
The historical cases are given in chronological order – starting with Christopher 
Columbus and concluding with Project Apollo.  
3.2 The Voyages of Christopher Columbus (1492-1502) 
3.2.1 Summary 
In 1492 Christopher Columbus set sail west from Spain to identify a trade route 
linking Europe with the Far East – instead he discovered America. Whilst his 
campaign could be considered a failure against the original objective, these 
initial discoveries eventually led to the settlement of Europeans in America and 
The Columbian Exchange – the movement of resources, plants, animals and 
diseases between Europe and America. In total, Columbus led four voyages 
from Spain to the New World and established multiple settlements on Hispaniola 
during this time. Whilst Columbus was considered an excellent mariner, his 
ability as a colonial administrator was poor. The colonists consistently rioted 
against his rule, he adopted strict control measures against the natives and, 
during his third voyage, he was arrested and sent back to Spain, stripped of all 
powers. Due to his expert knowledge of the area, Columbus was allowed to 
continue exploring for the Spanish - partly to ensure that he would not take his 
knowledge to rival countries. Despite the mounting evidence to the contrary, 
even on his death bed, he refused to believe that the land he discovered was not 
Asiatic.  
3.2.2 Mission Goal 
The program goal of Columbus‟s voyage was to identify a trade route west from 
Spain to the Far East in order to break the monopoly of Arab and Venetian spice 
traders. At a strategic level, the aim of the Spanish monarch was to increase its 
prosperity.  
3.2.3 Context 
Throughout the 15th century, trade between the Far East and Europe was 
primarily brought by land and sea along The Silk Road. However, the collapse of 
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the Mongol Empire interrupted this flow and forced Europeans to consider 
alternative ways of transporting goods. The Portuguese had established a 
number of trade outposts and fortified bases along the west coast of Africa and 
had begun to explore the establishment of a trade route from Portugal to China 
by traveling around the Horn of Africa. Without access to these posts or 
development of similar ones, it is unlikely that any other European country would 
have been successful in finding a trade route via the Horn of Africa. Hence, 
explorers began to investigate alternative ways to reach the Far East.   
3.2.4 Concept 
As early as 1480, Columbus believed that new trade routes with India and the 
Far East could be established by sailing west and around the earth as opposed 
to trekking over land. He conducted extensive research, including living in the 
Canary Islands and the Azores for months in order to observe the direction and 
strength of the winds. Initially he appealed to the King of Portugal for funds to 
support exploration. He requested three ships, to be made “Admiral of the 
Ocean”, be appointed governor of any lands discovered and given one-tenth of 
all profits from trade or land.  
Columbus proceeded to contact Genoa, Venice, the King of England and the 
King and Queen of Spain. In 1486, the Spanish monarch granted Columbus an 
audience; however he was rejected on the grounds that he had underestimated 
the distance to Asia. In order that Columbus did not take his proposals 
elsewhere, he was given an annual annuity from the Spanish and continued to 
lobby for their support. In 1492, Spain captured Muslim Granada and was able to 
turn its attention away from internal conflict towards other lands. After numerous 
requests for support, Spain decided to finance Columbus on his venture. Whilst 
protection and part-funding came from the Spanish monarch, half of the 
financing also came from private Italian investors. Columbus requested of the 
Spanish the same terms as he demanded of the Portuguese – all of which were 
granted. This was considered an extremely generous deal, which some believe 
highlights that the Spanish monarch believed the mission had a low chance of 
success.  
3.2.5 Exploration 
On 3rd August 1492, three ships, The Santa Maria (a large carrack), The Nina 
and The Pinta (two smaller caravels), containing approximately 96 men, began 
to sail west. The men on board the three ships were a mixture of sailors and 
pardoned condemned men. As the voyage was one of exploration, there were 
no soldiers or settlers aboard any of the three ships. The voyage did not begin 
well. The Spanish monarch had forced Juan de la Cosa, Martin Pinzon and 
Vicente Pinzon to provide The Nina and The Pinta. Within 3 days of leaving 
Spain, the rudder on The Pinta broke, and it has been speculated that sabotage 
was the cause. The Pinta was able to limp to the Canary Islands, where the 
rudder was repaired, the Nina‟s sails were re-rigged and further provisions were 
taken on board.  
Using the Canary Isles as his departure point is considered to be one of the key 
reasons for Columbus‟ success as this gave him the greatest chance of finding 
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the necessary winds. Typical mariners of the day would set sail against the wind 
to ensure they had a wind to return. However, Columbus set sail with the wind at 
his back, a very risky strategy for the time, because he knew he could find a 
wind to bring him home via the Azores. Ignoring wind, the intuitive choice would 
be to sail from the Azores or Cape Verde as they lie further west or further south. 
However, Columbus had gathered knowledge about the winds in each of the 
three potential locations and believed, correctly, that departing from the Canaries 
gave him the highest chance of success. 
Columbus was wary of managing the expectations of the sailors throughout the 
voyage. As such, he kept two logs of the distance traveled during the voyage. 
One was an underestimation of the distance traveled which he allowed the crew 
to see while the other recorded what he considered to be the true distance 
traveled. Columbus was understandably worried about the potential for mutiny 
and as such did not want the sailors to feel as if they were too far away from 
home. In addition, if land was not where Columbus expected it to be, this would 
give him additional time without the sailors being suspicious. He was well known 
for being optimistic and, retrospectively, the distance traveled was closer to the 
distance he recorded in the log for the sailors than in the log he kept for himself.  
On 7th October 1492, land which turned out to be one of the islands in the 
Bahamas3 was spotted by Rodrigo de Triana, but later claimed by Columbus.  
Columbus believed it to be an island off the east coast of Japan. Upon landing, 
Columbus quickly encountered friendly natives willing to trade and an 
abundance of food and water. Due to the unexpected availability of these natural 
resources, Columbus and his men were able to stay in the region for 
approximately three months and to continue to explore the surrounding islands. 
As he continued to explore and move west through the islands, he believed that 
the natives became more civilized – supporting his theory that they had reached 
the eastern coast of a great empire. 
During the exploration, The Santa Maria ran aground near Hispaniola and was 
abandoned. Columbus had begun to establish relationships with the most 
important native chief he could find and established a permanent settlement on 
the island as he could not bring all the men home. Thirty nine men were left 
behind and tasked with building a settlement, collecting gold samples and 
awaiting a new expedition from Spain. In tangibles, the net result of the voyage 
was a few gold trinkets, some non-European fruit, the loss of one ship and 
ultimately, and the lives of the 39 men left behind. While the mission may have 
been unprofitable, the output that Columbus brought back meant that on his 
second voyage, a total of 17 ships and 1300 men sailed to America. 
The aim of the second mission was colonization as well as exploration. 
Columbus took 3 ships to continue to explore the region whilst the 14 other ships 
were there to support colonization. Upon landing at the site of the original 
settlement, Columbus found all 39 men dead and the fort burned. Natives 
claimed that the men had mistreated the natives and had been killed. Columbus 
began the task of establishing a new settlement, Isabella, to the east of the 
                                               
3
 The exact island is unknown.  
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original settlement. However, because of the need to quickly establish a 
settlement for the men, he compromised in choosing a poor location in terms of 
water and soil. Exploration was still the focus of his attentions and management 
of the colony was passed to his brothers. Columbus again explored the 
surrounding area. He had promised the monarch a return on their investment 
would be forthcoming based on trade with the Far East. However, he was 
beginning to realize that Cuba was unlikely to be connected to Asia.  
On returning to Isabella, he found a colony out of control and war between the 
Spanish and natives. In order to control the natives and to achieve an immediate 
return, Columbus began to deport and enslave the natives, as had been the 
procedure with the Canary Islands rebellion. However, this was not in keeping 
with the King and Queen of Spain‟s view and, as such, the slaves were shipped 
back almost immediately. In addition, crops were not growing in the unfamiliar 
soil, gold production had almost stopped and provisions from Spain had run out. 
Columbus had misled the colonists about the standard of living on the island and 
the climate and because of this, his men were beginning to mutiny. He managed 
to restore peace to the colony and returned to Spain to answer criticisms of his 
style of government. Despite his inability to administrate the colony well, 
Columbus was an excellent mariner and by the end of his second voyage, he 
had identified the optimal return route. It was not until 1513 when the Gulf 
Stream was discovered that a faster route was identified.  
Columbus was beginning to face pressure to produce an output for his investors 
and the belief at the time was that land in similar latitudes would have similar 
minerals. Hence, on his third voyage, Columbus picked a route to the south of 
the previous two voyages. The Portuguese had discovered gold in Sierra Leone 
and Columbus intended to travel west along a similar latitude. Columbus 
eventually reached what is modern day Venezuela and believed that the new 
continent was sufficiently large that it could not be previously undiscovered. At 
this point, he still believed that the continent was connected to China. On this 
voyage, he brought another large contingent of settlers with him, expecting them 
to strengthen his position in the colony. Once he returned to Hispaniola in 1498, 
he found the colony in further disarray. He attributed this to the laziness of the 
Spaniards and not his distorted view of life in the colony. Where Columbus saw 
fertile soil, willing Indians to serve them, large quantities of gold and a 
comfortable climate, the men saw harsh soil, constant fighting with the locals, 
lack of output and hot sticky weather. The situation was so grim that Columbus 
hung a number of his own crew. The new settlers placed more pressure on the 
colony‟s resources and caused further problems. Columbus insisted on bringing 
skilled men with technical skills, artisans, miners, agriculturists, etc, rather than 
laborers. Three hundred settlers were brought out with only fifty laborers and 
only thirty women. As such, Columbus was forced to rely on natives for the hard 
labor.  
More complaints about how Columbus was treating his fellow Spaniards and his 
management of the colony were reaching the King and Queen of Spain. A new 
governor, Francisco de Bobadilla, was sent to Hispaniola to take control of the 
colony. Columbus and his two brothers were arrested and shipped back to 
Spain. Despite the wealth of evidence supporting the accusations against 
Columbus and his brothers, the King restored his freedom and his wealth; and, 
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after much persuasion, agreed to fund Columbus' fourth voyage in order that he 
not take his knowledge to other nations.  
On the fourth and final voyage, Columbus was forced to move away from an 
administrative role and focus solely on exploration. On this expedition, the aim 
was to identify a westward passage to the Indian Ocean. Support for Columbus 
by this point had begun to wane and was highlighted by the fact that the new 
Governor, Nicolas de Ovando, was equipped with 30 ships whilst Columbus was 
given 4 small caravels. Columbus was refused access to Hispaniola by the new 
governor, claiming that if Columbus was to land on the island, it would damage 
the islands precarious peaceful state. However, a hurricane was forming in the 
region which Columbus was aware of and he requested refuge whilst warning 
against any ships leaving the harbor. The Governor ignored his request and 
continued with his plans to sail. None of Columbus‟s ships were lost in the storm 
but a total of 19 of the Governor‟s ships sunk: the first Spanish treasure fleet to 
leave the New World, with 500 crewmen lost.  
Columbus continued to explore the region, discovering Central America and 
reaching Panama. Here, Columbus was told stories of a river reaching another 
ocean. Columbus set up a garrison in the area and continued to explore, 
however, the garrison was attacked and Columbus left for Hispaniola soon after. 
On his journey back, his ships were damaged through storm and woodworm and 
all four ships were forced to beach on the island of Jamaica. With no way of 
getting news to Hispaniola, two of the crew, assisted themselves by natives, 
were sent by canoe to get help. Ovando was in no hurry to send assistance and 
the crew was stranded for just over a year. As with previous encounters, the 
Spanish and Columbus found it difficult to remain on friendly terms with the 
natives. As time passed, the natives became more reluctant to provide the 
Spaniards with food and shelter. With relationships reaching the point of 
confrontation, Columbus scared the natives by predicting a solar eclipse would 
occur. The natives, scared by what Columbus was capable of doing, promised to 
give him and his men food and shelter in return for bringing back the sun. 
Eventually, Ovando sent ships to rescue Columbus and he returned to Spain via 
Hispaniola – his last voyage ending in failure.  
3.2.6 Dissolution 
On his death, Columbus still insisted that he had reached the east coast of Asia. 
In terms of the initial objective, the four voyages were all (inevitably) failures. 
However, at a strategic level it is difficult not to underestimate the impact of 
Columbus‟s discovery on a European and global scale at the time. For example, 
the tomato was not introduced into Italy until the mid 16th century when it was 
imported from South America. Cattle were not found in Texas prior to European 
settlement and potatoes were not extensively relied upon in Ireland. In addition, 
the impact of European settlers on the population of the Native Americans was 
huge. In particular, infectious diseases such as smallpox, wiped out large parts 
of Native American populations.  
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3.2.7 Key Statistics 
The statistics for the four voyages led by Columbus are given in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 – Statistics for 4 Columbus Missions (ships devoted in colonization in brackets) 
 Ships People Ships Lost People Lost 
Voyage 1 3 (0) ~90 1 (0) 39 
Voyage 2 3 (14) ~1300 0 (?) Unknown 
Voyage 3 3 (3) Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Voyage 4 4 (30) 90 4 (19) ~500 
3.2.8 Risk Lessons Learned 
If we view Columbus‟s voyages as a success (not in terms of the program goal 
but at the strategic level for Spain), then it is necessary to identify, in terms of 
risk, the potential reasons for this. First, Columbus was obsessive in his 
preparation and research. Some of his learning was incorrect, such as his trust 
of Marco Polo‟s assertion about Japan‟s distance from China. However his 
strategy of leaving with the winds at his back was less risky due to his 
knowledge about the direction of winds at different latitudes.  
Columbus was able to gather future support for his ventures based not only on 
the stories he brought back to Spain, but also on his tangible output. On his first 
voyage, he returned with gold, natives, non-European fruit and stories that the 
rivers were lined with gold. Without these items, it is possible that the stories 
Columbus brought home would not have been believed and his second voyage 
would not have been so strongly supported.  
A risk that Columbus encountered was in negotiating the area around 
Hispaniola. On his first voyage, a ship ran aground and had to be abandoned. 
On the return of his second voyage, his ship was caught in doldrums for days. 
On his fourth voyage, all four of his shops were lost to storm damage and 
woodworm.   
Finally, Columbus was fortunate to identify a location abundant in natural 
resources and friendly natives. When there was a mission failure and loss of a 
ship, Columbus had redundancy in the other two ships he had taken, but was 
able to offer his men a potentially safe haven on the island. It is possible that if 
Columbus had landed elsewhere, this opportunity would not have been 
available.  
3.2.9 Comparison between Columbus and Cabot 
It is instructive to compare the voyages of Columbus with the voyages of John 
Cabot because both shared a common exploration goal, although different 
initiating conditions resulted in different event histories. 
John Cabot was granted a charter by the English monarch but his voyage was a 
privately funded venture. He found mainland America in 1497 - one year prior to 
Columbus – but due to his unwillingness to explore more than a bows length in-
land, he was unable to find any natural resources at his destination and he 
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returned to England with nothing more than stories of land. For his 2nd mission in 
1498, he received only 5 ships; small in comparison with Columbus‟s 17 ships. 
Historical records show that only one out of the five ships managed to return to 
England. A graphical comparison between the two voyages underlines the 
importance that the availability of natural resources at destination has, not only 
on mission outcome but also at a program level.  
From Figure 3.1, we see three messages emerge. First, as Columbus 
demonstrated that land existed and hence turned an “unknown unknown” into a 
“known unknown”, Cabot was able to undertake the mission with fewer ships 
than Columbus. Second, Columbus was able to stay at his destination almost 
three times as long as Cabot could due to the availability of natural resources. 
Finally, at a program level, the amount of support that is offered for future 
ventures increases when tangible outputs are returned.  
3.2.10  Key references 
Fernandez-Armesto F (1992) Columbus, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Irving W. (2005) The Life and Voyages of Christopher Columbus, Kindle Edition, 
Public Domain Books. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Comparison of Columbus and Cabot Highlighting the Effect of In Situ Resources on Time at 
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3.3 Raleigh’s colonization of America (1585-1590) 
3.3.1 Summary 
England was initially slow in establishing colonies in America. This was due to 
religious in-fighting taking place in England during the 16th century and the 
restrictive financial laws at the time that meant that private ventures carried with 
them a large risk4. In 1584, Sir Walter Raleigh dispatched two reconnaissance 
ships to identify a suitable colony location on the North Carolina coast. In 1585, 
seven ships were used to bring out 108 men and supplies to establish a 
settlement on Roanoke Island. Due to food shortages, the colony was initially 
abandoned and all the colonists returned to England onboard a passing ship. In 
1587, 117 men, women and children arrived in three ships at the Roanoke 
colony. However, a dispute arose within the expedition regarding the location of 
the colony and how best to move the settlement. The settlement remained 
temporarily at its location and whilst supply vessels had been ready to return in 
the spring of 1588 to support its movement, every English ship now was 
expected to remain and fight the threat of the Spanish Armada to the homeland. 
John White, the governor, was unable to return to Roanoke until 1590 by which 
time the colony had disappeared.  
3.3.2 Mission Goal 
The primary objective of the settlement was never made clear. The settlement 
had three aims – to serve as a base to explore the surrounding country, a 
settlement to identify potential problems with living on American soil, and as a 
port for English privateerers plundering in the Caribbean. However, the way in 
which the colonists prioritized these aims changed over time. At a strategic level, 
the goals were prosperity and increased security for England.  
3.3.3 Context 
During the 16th Century, the English monarchy moved between Catholic and 
Protestant heads of state, eventually reaching stability under the Protestant 
Elizabeth I. This constant in-fighting, the unfriendly Scots on her northern border, 
the constant threat from continental Catholic Europe and the strict financial laws 
of the day ensured that during the 16th Century, colonization of America was not 
a high priority. Only when Elizabeth I had been on the throne for 25 years did 
England begin to look west. The expansion of the Spanish and the Portuguese 
in America had not been overlooked, and towards the end of the 16th Century, 
England began to consider colonial expansion. 
3.3.4 Concept 
Whilst the campaign was carried out by the funding and support of Sir Walter 
Raleigh, colonization plans began with Sir Humfrey Gilbert. In 1578, Gilbert was 
granted letter-patents by the Queen to begin the colonization of America. Gilbert 
spent time identifying a suitable location to colonize in modern Rhode Island and 
                                               
4
 Private financiers were liable for any debt incurred by the venture. The state was not 
stable enough that it could finance long-term colonisation plans. 
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Connecticut. Gilbert was the first to achieve plans for an American settlement 
but he died on a reconnaissance voyage in 1583. The colonization charter was 
subsequently passed to his brother-in-law, Sir Walter Raleigh.  
Raleigh sent two reconnaissance ships in 1584, piloted by Simao Fernandes, a 
Portuguese explorer, but focused further south than Gilbert and subsequently 
identified Roanoke Island, situated in modern day Virginia, as a potential location 
of any future colonization. The reason for identifying a site further south than 
originally intended by Gilbert was so that they were sufficiently south that they 
could attack the Spanish shipping lanes but still far enough north that they could 
avoid constant attack from the Spanish. Here they encountered friendly natives, 
good quality soil and weather that they believed could harvest tropical plants 
such as bananas and pineapples.  
3.3.5 Exploration 
By early 1585, diplomatic relations between Spain and England had broken 
down and the Queen had issued a “Letter of Marquee” for plundering Spanish 
vessels at any opportunity. The Spanish were in the process of transporting 
riches from America back to Spain and this move by the Queen offered the 
potential for opportunistic English mariners to get rich quickly by privateering 
Spanish ships. At the same time, Raleigh had begun to assemble the necessary 
equipment and men to embark on a colonization mission. On April 9th 1585, 
seven ships containing approximately 500 men, of which 108 were colonists and 
the rest made up of soldiers and seamen, sailed from Plymouth to Roanoke 
Island under the direction of Sir Richard Greenville. The 108 colonists, led by 
Ralph Lane, were exclusively male, most of whom were “gentlemen” who were 
unlikely to want to get their hands dirty by building and cultivating.  
The colonists began by establishing a fort and a small village. Lane served as 
Governor and used the men to explore the surrounding area. They initially 
attempted to survive through cultivation and trade with the natives. However, the 
garrison was doomed from the beginning. The colonists arrived too late in the 
season for planting, and supplies were dwindling rapidly. To make matters 
worse, Lane, who was a military captain, alienated the neighboring Roanoke 
Indians.  
In addition, there were two poor fundamental decisions prior to the situation 
deteriorating. The first was the latitude of the settlement. The site was chosen for 
strategic and agriculture reasons. It was assumed that the weather at this 
location would be similar to that of Italy due to the similar latitude. However, 
information regarding this area was sparse. English knowledge of the area round 
Newfoundland and Caribbean was plentiful but for the American coastline it was 
poor.  The only firsthand knowledge regarding the location was that gathered the 
year previously on the reconnaissance mission. In fact, the microclimate and soil 
at Roanoke Island was unable to support the crops the English expected to 
grow.  
The location also lacked a suitable harbor. A suitable harbor was essential to 
supply the settlers, develop commerce in the area and to use as a base to attack 
Spanish ships. The two harbors in the location were insufficient and only ships 
between 20 and 70 tons could use the harbors; all other ships had to anchor 
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several miles out in dangerous waters. Lane realized the need to move to an 
alternative site with a better harbor and identified Chesapeake Bay as being 
appropriate. Lane planned to wait until supplies arrived from England and then to 
move a number of men north to Chesapeake Bay, establish a new base and 
move the rest of the colonists later.  
However, supplies were delayed and in June 1586, due to food shortages, the 
colonists left on board a passing ship of Sir Francis Drake. Supplies arrived one 
week later with three ships and inevitably found no one. Part of the charter given 
to Raleigh was for “continual settlement” and without it, Raleigh would lose his 
charter. Because of this, Greenville left behind a holding party of 15 men.  
In July 1587, Raleigh sent three more ships containing 117 men, women and 
children with a new Governor, John White. Raleigh wished to move the 
settlement away from being reliant on supplies from England to being completely 
self-sufficient. As such, he chose settlers that wanted to build a life in America 
and land was offered as an incentive for those in England to move.  
Lane had communicated to Raleigh the need to move the settlement to a new 
base further north. White immediately began by attempting to convince the 
leaders of the expedition, Grenville and Fernandes, to help aid the colonists 
move the settlement north to Chesapeake Bay. However, Fernandes was not 
accommodating to the needs of the new governor. White continuously 
complained about the prioritization of Fernandes on the journey over. White did 
not wish to place at risk the lives of the colonists, which included his daughter, to 
attack Spanish ships. However, Fernandes relentlessly attacked Spanish ships 
at every opportunity.  
When the expedition arrived at Roanoke Island, White planned to pick up the 
group that had been left behind by in the previous year and move the entire 
group immediately north to Chesapeake Bay. However, there were no survivors 
from the previous settlement. Fernandes ordered that the fleet of ships would go 
no further north than Roanoke Island. There are mixed reasons for Fernandes to 
take such a course of action.  While he had experience of the Indians in the 
Chesapeake Bay region and expected them to be hostile to the establishment of 
a colony White believed that the reason was more vindictive. The colonists were 
not happy with the location but were forced to settle there and White left to 
gather more supplies and transportation from England.  
On his return to England, the Spanish Armada attacked England culminating in 
the Battle of Gravelines in 1588. Whilst the English were successful in defending 
against the attack, White was unable to get a ship until 1590. When he finally 
reached Roanoke Island, there was no one at the settlement. There was no sign 
of distress and the general belief is that the colony had moved inland. Raleigh 
had an interest in maintaining this belief as he did not wish to lose his charter.  
3.3.6 Dissolution 
Whilst the initial settlement was not a success, the lessons learned and the 
boldness of the venture eventually led to the settlement of North America by the 
English.  
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3.3.7 Key Statistics 
Table 3.2 summarizes the key statistics for the three exploration phases. 
Table 3.2 – Statistics for Raleigh Exploration 
 Ships People Ships Lost People Lost 
Settlement 1 7  109 1  109 
Holding Party  Unknown ~15 Unknown ~15 
Settlement 2 3  117 Unknown 117 
 
3.3.8 Risk Lessons Learned 
The venture was ultimately a failure for a number of reasons. First the number of 
participants involved in the project was very small – less than 250. This is an 
indication of the relative wealth of England at that time and the small amount of 
money that could be directed towards American colonization. In comparison, 
early Spanish attempts at colonization had more than 1000 settlers. 
The site did not have a suitable harbor to carry out the raids they had envisaged 
or to supply the colony. The lack of harbor also jeopardized the mission at the 
start. The majority of the first year‟s provisions were lost as the lead ship ran 
aground and whilst this did not cause an immediate problem as the settlers were 
able to obtain food from the natives, it highlighted problems with the site. Ships 
over 70 tons had to anchor several miles out of the bay. Plans were put in place 
to move the settlement north to a more suitable harbor once the colony had 
settled. Raleigh was made aware of these plans and when the second wave of 
settlers arrived, the plan was to abandon Roanoke and to move to Chesapeake 
Bay. However, Fernandes appeared unwilling to spend time supporting the 
colony when he could be profitably plundering Spanish ships. Ultimately the 
colonists were forced to remain at their location. 
Problems of supplying and organizing a military colony miles from its homeland 
were well known and should not have posed a significant problem. However, as 
the purpose of the settlement was not clearly established, the strategy of re-
supplying the colony was not clear. In the first attempt, all supplies were carried 
from England to the colony. On future crossings, the ships would stop in the 
West-Indies en route to trade and collect plants, livestock and salt for the colony. 
However, the sailors in control of the supply ships did not want to waste valuable 
space simply on supplies when their primary objective was privateering.  
Early developers understood that there were four ways in which to finance the 
colony: 
 
1) Direct funding by the state (which was not an option in this case); 
2) Run a non-profit colony experiment funded by some other money-making 
enterprise; 
3) Have the settlers fund it themselves, paying for supplies for as long as it took 
before they achieved self-sufficiency; 
Historical Exploration – Learning Lessons from the Past to Inform the Future                                       Bedford, Quigley, Revie and Walls 
 
 
Page 31                 
 
 
4) Fund through mineral resources or a highly profitable staple crop, such as 
tobacco (which ultimately funded the Jamestown venture – the first 
successful permanent English settlement).  
 
For the first wave of settlers, it is unclear how Raleigh expected to fund the 
venture in the long-term. He might have expected sailors to use it as a base to 
attack Spanish ships. He expected the second wave of settlers to be motivated 
to make a success of the venture, as they were partially funding themselves. 
3.3.9 Dynamic Systemic Risk Model 
We have proposed using a Dynamic Systemic Risk Model (DSRM) to track 
strategic level risk during exploration. Figure 3.2 introduces part of the DSRM. 
The motivation behind the DSRM is to model the dynamic interactions between 
mission, program and strategic levels. In the DSRM, the inner circle represents 
the experiences and decisions made by the crew, while the outer circle 
represents the experiences and decisions made by the leaders of the campaign. 
For the inner loop, if the crew is highly motivated, then this can lead to positive 
actions and to positive experiences. This means the crew reflects well on the 
experience, the exploration is meeting their expectations and their motivation 
increases. This is a reinforcing loop. If the crew is unmotivated, then they will 
start to carry out selfish actions leading to bad experiences for all. The crew then 
reflects poorly on what they are accomplishing, their expectations are no longer 
being met and they become further de-motivated.  
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Figure 3.2 – Mission and Program Level of Dynamic Systemic Risk Model 
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For the outer loop, the leaders of an exploration campaign are motivated to carry 
out a given task. If the leaders receive relevant information from multiple sources 
that provides insight into what the exploration might achieve, then this allows 
them to reflect and take decision focusing upon the goals of the mission and the 
incentives for the crew.  
The two loops do not exist independently. There are two natural control loops in 
the case of incentives and goals which aim to align the goals and priorities of the 
leaders with the goals and priorities of the crew.  
At this point in its development, the DSRM is a simple system dynamics model 
which would theoretically follow through with a deterministic analysis.  However, 
the evidence we have gathered, suggests that exploration campaigns rarely 
follow a deterministic path because there always exists a number of unwanted 
events that occur randomly that disturb the system.  
In the case of Raleigh‟s colonization plans, the first settlement had many 
different goals which caused the men to become unmotivated which led to 
selfish actions. This led to poor experiences and ultimately to the colony not 
meeting its expectations. In order to address this, Raleigh prepared to send 
supply ships to stock the men. However the unwanted event was that the 
supplies were delayed and a ship passed that was willing to take the colonists 
home. For the second settlement, Raleigh changed the goal to establishing a 
self-sustaining settlement. In order to align the goals of the crew and himself, he 
gave land as an incentive to each family. In this case, the unwanted events were 
the lack of support within the party for moving the colony and the Spanish 
Armada invading England and delaying supplies. 
3.3.10 Key References 
Morison S.E. (1971) The European Discovery of America: Vol1: The Northern 
Voyages, Oxford University Press, USA. 
Quinn D.B. (1974) England and the Discovery of North America, 1481-1620, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London. 
 
3.4 Darien Scheme: Scottish Colony in Isthmus of Panama (1693-1707) 
3.4.1 Summary 
The Darien Scheme aimed to develop a colony in the Isthmus of Panama at the 
end of the 17th century as a means of bringing economic prosperity to Scotland 
through its management of trade at this strategically important location. The 
vision for the Scheme is credited to William Patterson. On returning to Scotland, 
Patterson promoted his vision for Darien. He was passionate about the 
opportunity that the Darien Scheme would afford Scotland and fluent in the 
communication of this vision. The result was the passing of an Act of the 
Scottish Parliament in 1695 to create the Company of Scotland. On raising 
£400k in subscriptions from Scottish investors only, the Company aimed to enact 
the vision for the Darien Scheme through two waves of exploration, in 1698 and 
1699 respectively. Both explorations failed to establish a colony due to the 
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effects of both natural and intentional hazards. The consequences of failure 
were high. More than 2000 of the 2500 men, women and children sent to Darien 
lost their lives and the £400k invested reputedly equated to between 25%-50% 
of the wealth of Scotland at the time. It is generally accepted that the failure of 
Darien led to the formation of the United Kingdom in 1707 and hence was a 
strategically important event that changed the course of British history.    
3.4.2 Mission Goal 
The overarching goal of the Darien Scheme was to set up a Scottish Colony on 
the Isthmus of Panama, which has a strategically important location for trade 
that would bring economic prosperity to Scotland and ensure its independence.  
Figure 3.3 shows the location of Darien today. 
3.4.3 Context 
Seventeenth century Scotland had many decades of political, religious and 
economic discontent. Scotland also held great resentment against England 
about economic affairs. Scotland had become poorer following the Union of the 
Crowns. Scotland was required to get involved in England‟s wars, and lost her 
only colony in Nova Scotia compromising her trading privileges. Trade 
frustrations were further exacerbated by the Navigation Act (which forbade 
goods to be imported to England or its colonies by ships other than English or 
the countries from which they originated) and by the monopoly on trade with the 
East Indies and Africa held by two English Trading Companies, the East India 
Company and the Royal Africa Company.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 - Location of Proposed Scottish colony at Darien on Isthmus of Panama 
Source: http://www.escapeartist.com 
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3.4.4 Concept 
Against this background, in 1695 Scottish-born William Paterson, a serial 
promoter of money-making schemes generated an idea that the Scottish 
Parliament should follow up the 1693 Act for “Incourageing Forraign Trade” by 
granting a monopoly of trade with Africa and the Indies to a Scottish trading 
company. A key element of the plan was the establishment of a Scottish colony 
at Darien in Central America where a free port could be set up to allow goods to 
be exchanged between merchant ships from Africa and Asia across the isthmus.  
Theoretically, Patterson‟s proposition that “Trade will increase trade, and money 
will beget money ... Thus this door to the seas, and the key of the universe ... will 
of course enable its proprietors to give laws to both oceans, and to become 
arbitrators to the commercial world” is logical. 
Patterson presented a persuasive argument in Edinburgh and in 1695 the 
Scottish Parliament passed an Act establishing “The Company of Scotland 
Trading to Africa and the Indies”. Its capital was to be £600k with 50% of the 
subscriptions from both England and Scotland.  However although the English 
share was met, the English investors soon withdrew once King William opposed 
the plan for a Scottish colony in Spanish-claimed territory. Timely lobbying by the 
Directors of the East India Company of a King who was trying to appease Spain 
was the cause. Consequently a revised target of £400k was set and the 
investment was raised entirely within Scotland. Attempts to share the risk of 
investment in, for example, Hamburg, failed. It is estimated that £400k 
represented about half of Scotland‟s available capital and was raised by all 
sectors of society. The risk of investment was not spread beyond Scotland. It 
has been suggested that commercial inexperience was a reason for such a 
naïve approach, however any damages incurred by Company of Scotland would 
be covered by public monies, hence the risks to the Directors were mitigated. 
The decision to site the colony at Darien was influenced by the evidence 
provided by Wafer. Through the maps, journals, letters and stories presented by 
Wafer, it is claimed that the Directors were presented with a full set of 
information about the conditions.  
3.4.5 Exploration 
The five ships for the expedition were bought in Hamburg and Holland: one was 
a former French vessel, the Dolphin, but the others reflecting the hope of the 
Scottish expedition – the Caledonia, St. Andrew, Unicorn and Endeavour. 
Provisions included cannon, guns, swords, axes, hammers, nails, clothing and 
household goods. That the expedition was ill-prepared was clear from the goods 
stocked for trade – combs, bonnets and tartan socks. Crew and colonists were 
recruited from Scotland. In total, around 1200 people were to take part in the first 
expedition, including William Paterson. This is estimated to be around 0.12% of 
Scotland‟s population of 1 million at the time. 
The first expedition left the port of Leith on 18 July 1698. In order to protect the 
interests of the Company of Scotland, the location of colony remained a secret to 
crew and emigrants. The sealed orders were opened once the ships were clear 
of Madeira where they were informed that they were “to proceed to the Bay of 
Darien, and make the Isle called the Golden Island….some few leagues to the 
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leeward mouth of the great River of Darien….and there make a settlement on 
the mainland”.     
They made landfall on 2 November 1698, having lost 70 people during the 
voyage. They named the jungle peninsula New Caledonia. The site of the first 
settlement failed to provide a viable fortification, hence a second site, now called 
Fort St Andrew, was developed. The colonists issued a proclamation declaring 
freedom of trade and of religion, sent friendly messages to the Spanish 
Governors and entered into negotiations with the natives for the purchase of the 
land. News of their safe arrival and settlement arrived in Edinburgh in March 
1699 and was widely celebrated. The Colony was governed by a committee of 5, 
later expanded to 7, from whom a President was selected and rotated on a 
weekly basis. Representatives were elected from each of the regions of Darien. 
However, the reality was that the land was unsuitable for agriculture and the 
Indians were not interested in the goods brought for trade.  Early in 1699 
torrential rains led to spread of disease and by March 1699 more than 200 
colonists had died, including Paterson‟s wife, with the death rate rising to over 10 
a day. Those surviving were weak and for them life was harrowing – back-
breaking labor, lack of food and malaria, yellow fever and dysentery were 
endemic.   
In January 1699, a ship carrying supplies for the colony was dispatched but was 
shipwrecked on the west coast of Scotland. Two other relief ships sent 
afterwards but were delayed en route and hence did not reach Darien until 
several months after their expected arrival. This logistical delay meant no 
provisions for an already weak population. 
Of the ships sent out to trade supplies, all but one returned unsuccessfully with 
news that all English ships and colonies were forbidden to trade with Scots by 
order of King William. One, the Dolphin, was captured by the Spanish with the 
imprisonment of its crew. There was discontent that while the colonists were 
suffering, others were quarrelling as power struggles arose among the elected 
councilors. 
When news arrived that the Spanish were planning to attack, the colony was 
abandoned. Recent evidence suggests that this attack was fiercer than originally 
thought. Further, it appears that the Spanish were already preparing a more 
forceful attack had this first one not being successful at removing the threat of 
the colony. Of the four ships that fled, only the Caledonia made it back to 
Scotland, with less than 300 people on board. The other ships - the Endeavour, 
St Andrew and Unicorn - were sunk in transit due to three independent bad 
weather events.  
Unaware of the fate of the first expedition – reasons include natural 
communication lags in late 17th century as well as intentional denial of rumors of 
failure of the first colony – a second expedition left Scotland in autumn 1699. Led 
by three ships – the Rising Sun, Duke of Hamilton and Hope – a further 1300 
settlers headed to Darien, of these 160 reputedly died en route. The second 
batch were originally meant to support the original settlers but on finding the 
colony abandoned, they set about rebuilding the colony, but with no more 
success than their predecessors relative to whom they were arguably less well 
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prepared. It is acknowledged that the men and women sent to Darien were 
completely unprepared for the harshness of the conditions; they were under 
constant threat of attack from the Spanish and had no support from the English 
colonies who had been ordered not to aid the Scots. One newly arrived officer, 
Captain Campbell, persuaded colonists to launch a pre-emptive strike against 
the Spanish forces massing at Toubacanti on the mainland. While the attack was 
very successful, the consequence was that the Spanish under the command of 
Governor-General Pimiento, formed a massive fleet and army besieged Fort St 
Andrew, which finally surrendered in March 1700. Given the state of the 
colonists – only 300 were considered fit for duty and the death rate was 16 
people per day – the Spanish commander set easy terms of surrender. In April 
1700, the surviving colonists were permitted to vacate the fort on board their 
remaining ships after 4.5 months at Darien. Only a handful ever made it back to 
Scotland with the Hope of Bo’ness being surrendered to the Spanish at 
Carthegenia and the remaining ships – Rising Sun, Duke of Hamilton and Hope 
– sinking in hurricanes in the Caribbean or off the coast of the Carolinas 
between April and October 1700. Hence, like the first attempt at colonization, 
more lives were lost from disasters at sea after clearing from Caledonia rather 
than in the colony itself. It is reputed that only about 30 people returned home. 
3.4.6 Dissolution 
The Darien venture was a political, economic and social disaster for Scotland. It 
is claimed that Scotland lost 25% to 50% of its liquid assets. Financially Scotland 
was unable to retain its independence and on 1 May 1707 joined England as a 
junior partner in the Act of Union to form the United Kingdom of Great Britain. As 
part of the deal, Scotland was provided with the rights to free trade and England 
paid off Scotland's debts with the 'Equivalent', a sum of £398,000, most of which 
went to cover the Company of Scotland's losses. By Article XV the Company of 
Scotland was dissolved. Over 2000 people died in the Darien venture. The few 
returning survivors of Darien were considered “pariahs” and given little support 
from family and compatriots. Paterson was forced to defend his role and is 
reputed to have died a disillusioned man. Campbell, although awarded the 
Toubacanti Medal for his role, never stopped blaming the Company of Scotland 
for failing to support its colonists. Many Scots believed that their independence 
had been deliberately sabotaged by the English. 
In contrast to the accepted view that Darien was a disaster, Nat Edwards, of the 
National Library of Scotland, proposed in 2006 that Panama considers Paterson 
a visionary of their potential for international trade - his image is on a frieze at 
the mouth of the Panama Canal – and he argued that the governance of the 
colony represented the first attempt at democracy in the region. 
3.4.7 Key Statistics 
Table 3.3 shows key statistics for the Darien scheme. 
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Table 3.3 – Campaign Statistics for Darien Scheme (Monetary values expressed 17
th
 
Century prices) 
 Inputs Outcomes 
 Value  % Investment  
 Financial 
Investment 
 £400K  ~40% liquid assets 
($140M 2008 silver price) 
 -$398K 
 Number of    
Ships 
 17  
(9 main, 8 relief) 
  1 main ship returns 
 Number of 
People 
 ~2500  ~ 0.12% population  ~30 survive 
 ~230 die outward 
 ~1640 die at Darien 
 ~ 600 return trip 
 
3.4.8 Risk Lessons Learned  
The mission failed to establish a colony at Darien and the consequences of that 
failure were catastrophic for a nation. In this section, we explore why and what 
might be learnt from this experience.  Figure 3.4 provides a summary of the main 
risks in the form of a belief network.   
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The governance of the colony was based upon a democratic council with a 
weekly rotating President. While the key actors in the scheme are identifiable – 
the investors, the crew, the colonists, the competitors – there was no one leader 
commanding the venture. Paterson plays a role through all phases – 
conceptualization, decision-making, journey and colonization – however he 
influences rather than directs events. The Directors of the Company of Scotland 
have considerable power, setting the exploration strategy. However they are 
divorced from the operational activities of the mission, in part because no system 
of command appears to have been established for leading the mission.  
Scotland was following the European trend for colonization and having bought 
into the vision for Darien, the Directors of the Company of Scotland construct a 
false model for their scheme. Further, they fail to update their model using the 
data provided a priori or realized during the mission. Even when news of the 
failure of Darien reaches Scotland, it is claimed that the propaganda promoting 
the success of the venture prevailed, until the few survivors returned home. By 
this time public perception had bought into the false model so strongly that the 
survivors were blamed for the failure rather than supported as victims of the 
exploration.    
It is accepted that the Company did have incomplete information and that there 
would have been considerable uncertainty about, for example, the actual 
environment, the actions of competitors, and the reliability of equipment. 
However it is clear that learning from experience was poor. For example, a 
vicious cycle emerges when the strategic goals of the venture and the 
motivations of the colonists faced with starvation came into conflict leading to 
changing objectives from colonization to survival. This shift from the original goal 
triggered the events leading to the loss of the original investment in the scheme.   
Originally the colonists‟ expectations appear to be matched by the incentives 
offered. However the changing circumstances arising when the weather 
deteriorates, food supplies dwindle and disease takes hold, initiates another 
vicious cycle. This is further sustained by the lack of provision for safe havens 
made after abandoning the colony and, of course, the lack of support from the 
nation.    
The major decisions for Darien appear to be emotionally charged and hence lack 
a rigorous rational analysis. With hindsight, many of the sources of the 
uncertainties are recognizable hazards for which mitigation and avoidance 
strategies could have been developed. This is perhaps particularly true for the 
operational elements of the transportation and colonization phases. The major 
failing though in the Darien case is strategic. 
3.4.10 Key References 
Ferguson W (1990) Scotland: 1689 to the Present: The Edinburgh History 
Society of Scotland, Volume 4.  Mercat Press, Edinburgh. 
Prebble J (1968) The Darien Disaster, Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh. 
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3.5 John Franklin in Search of the North West Passage (1819-1848) 
3.5.1 Summary 
John Franklin was an English Rear-Admiral, whose ill-fated mission in 1845 is 
credited with leading to the discovery of the North-West passage, the 
Canadian-Arctic waterway connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific. Franklin led 
three expeditions to the Arctic, first in 1819-1822, then in 1824-1827 before his 
final mission, which set off in 1845.  The investment by the British government 
increased with each expedition. For example, the number and quality of ships, 
number and skill of crew and amount and type of supplies increased 
consistently.  None of the explorations were without incident but the final 
mission was catastrophic with no survivors. Lessons were learnt from earlier 
missions, although risks identified were conditioned upon the British Navy‟s 
world view which was biased by their imperial arrogance and hence failed to 
appreciate the major environmental and technology risk drivers. Five ships were 
abandoned and lost in the search for Franklin, although considerable data were 
discovered during the search. These included the expedition records, which 
provided a last entry on 25 April 1848, the testimonies of the Inuit and the 
skeletons of the crew. Pieced together, these data provide a picture of a 
sequence of events that led to disaster.  
3.5.2 Mission Goal 
The overarching goal of all missions was to chart and navigate parts of the 
Northwest Passage. There were dual motivations: initially, to establish trade 
routes; and later to generate scientific knowledge.  The specific goals of the 
three missions are tabulated below.  
Mission Dates Goal 
1 1819-22 Chart western coast of Hudson Bay to Arctic 
2 1824-27 Chart region between McKenzie River (now Canada) 
and Point Beechey (now Alaska) 
3 1845- Chart remaining 300 or so miles of the North West 
Passage not yet mapped. 
3.5.3 Context 
Franklin‟s explorations took place within the so-called “imperial century” of the 
British Empire from 1815-1914 during which time circa 10 million square miles 
and circa 400 million people joined the empire. After defeating Napoleon, Britain 
had no serious rivals and the British Royal Navy held supremacy of the sea. 
Britain was regarded as the global policeman, both directly controlling and 
indirectly influencing many economies. Retrospectively, this period has become 
known as Pax Britannica.  
Franklin was born in 1786 and joined the Royal Navy at 14 years. He served in 
various battles, including Trafalgar in 1805, before taking command of the Trent 
in 1818 on the Arctic expedition led by Captain David Buchanan which sought to 
reach the North Pole. 
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3.5.4 Concept 
On 28 May 1819, Franklin captained the Hudson Bay Company owned ship, the 
Prince of Wales, on its journey from England to Hudson Bay.  On 9 September 
1819, Franklin led an overland expedition from the western shore of the Hudson 
Bay to the Arctic Ocean. Between 1819 and 1822, he led the survey of part of 
the coast to the east of the Coppermine River in the Northwest Territories of 
Canada. The crew largely comprised voyageurs - boatmen employed by the fur 
companies. The mission encountered many difficulties, not least was lack of 
food due to the limited supplies and the lack of opportunity to re-stock on route 
within the harsh terrain of the Arctic. Of the 29 crew, including Franklin, only 9 
survived. Twenty died of starvation. Franklin survived, but became known as the 
“man who ate his boots” because he is reputed to have resorted to eating leather 
from his own footwear. Franklin returned to England to recuperate and in 1823 
published his story in “Narrative of a Journey to the Shores of the Polar Sea in 
the Years 1819, 20, 21 and 22”.  
Franklin led a second overland expedition to the same region in 1825-27 
although on this occasion the exploration aimed to survey the North American 
coast westward from the mouth of the MacKenzie River in Northwestern Canada 
to Point Beechey now in Alaska. This expedition was better equipped and 
supplied than the previous one. The British Admiralty had invested in four 
specially built ships: three mahogany and ash vessels; the fourth a light ash-
framed canvas boat. Franklin‟s crew comprised officers, marines and sailors of 
the British Royal Navy. They were allocated supplies that included non-
perishable provisions, such as macaroni and soup, which were packaged well 
within 3 redundant layers of waterproof canvas. This mission successfully 
mapped 1200 miles of the coastline without serious incident and the journey was 
described in the 1828 publication “Narrative of a Second Expedition to the 
Shores of the Polar Sea in the Years 1825, 1826 and 1827”.  Following this 
mission, Franklin was knighted in 1829.    
3.5.5 Exploration  
Franklin, now 55, was second choice to lead the expedition chart the final 300 
miles or so of the Northwest Passage. The first choice, Sir James Ross, declined 
for family reasons. Franklin had spent the intervening years as, amongst other 
appointments, Governor of what is now known as Tasmania.  
The British Admiralty provided Franklin with two seasoned ships, which had just 
returned from successful missions in the Antarctic, and which were equipped 
with modern technology such as steam engines, protective mechanisms for the 
rudder and propellers and a steam heating device for crew comfort. The two 
ships, the Erebus and the Terror, were captained by younger, but still 
experienced veterans of Arctic and Antarctic campaigns, Captain James 
Fitzjames and Captain Francis Rawdon Moria Crozier respectively. In total there 
were 128 Royal Navy officers and men, all under the primary command of 
Franklin. The mission was given supplies and provisions expected to last for 3 
years and included both non-perishables – both conventionally preserved and 
tinned - and livestock, which were boarded at what is Godhaven in Greenland 
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today. Further the ships were furnished with the comforts of home, including 
large libraries with over 2000 books. 
Unlike the previous two missions - where the survey expedition was made 
overland and the ships were simply a means of transportation to the base 
location - this final exploration aimed to sail the final few hundred untracked 
miles of the passage. Franklin‟s expedition set sail on 19 May 1845 from 
England and was last seen by British Whalers on 28 July 1845 north of Baffin 
Island at the entrance to Lancaster Sound. 
Both ships wintered at Beechey Island between 1845-6, after which they 
returned southwards. In September 1846 they become trapped in ice in Victoria 
Strait, off King William Island and stayed there for 1.5 years. It appears that the 
weather was unusually harsh resulting in the prolonged frozen conditions. Under 
more normal conditions, the ships might have expected to have been set free 
when the ice melted.  Franklin and 23 others died between September 1846 and 
April 1848.  On 22 April 1848, the remaining 105 crew abandoned the ships to 
head south across the North American mainland. There are reports that the men 
attempted to unload the ships furniture and appeared disoriented.  Other reports 
indicate that men fell and died as they walked. There are suggestions that some 
resorted to cannibalism. The post-mortems of several preserved bodies of crew 
suggest that lead poisoning was prevalent and may have contributed to the 
mental and physical decline of the men. The lead poisoning is attributed to faulty 
food tins, where beads of solder present on the interior edges were able to 
interact with the contents and are believed to have occurred because a new, 
cheap supplier was selected and given a short lead time to produce supplies for 
the mission. It appears that while his patent was sound, his manufacturing 
quality control was not. 
3.5.6 Dissolution 
After no news had been heard of the exploration for 2 years, a search was 
launched in 1847 funded initially by Franklin‟s‟ wife and from 1848 by the British 
Admiralty which also offered a £20000 reward. For 12 years the search 
continued without generating any information about the fate of Franklin‟s 
expedition. The search missions are reputed to have been the largest push into 
the Arctic and involved several dozen ships, largely British but also some from 
the United States. Five ships were lost. The Admiralty continued to fund 
searches until 31 March 1854 when they declared the crew deceased in service. 
It was not until 1859 when a final search mission, sent in 1857 and funded by 
Franklin‟s wife, Lady Jane Franklin, and led by Captain Francis Leopold 
McClintock, found written expedition records and crew skeletons on King William 
Island, south and west of Lancaster Sound, approximately mid-way between the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.  Analysis of these records and postmortems of the 
skeletons, together with data collected from testimonies of local Inuit, help piece 
together the final stage of Franklin‟s exploration. 
3.5.7 Key Statistics 
Table 3.4 shows key statistics for Franklin. 
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Table 3.4 – Key Statistics for Franklin Missions 
Exploration Ships Crew Ships Lost People Lost 
1819-22 1  29 0  20 
1824-27 4 - 0 - 
1845 5  129 5 129 
 
3.5.8 Risk Lessons Learned 
Despite improved technology, highly trained crew, greater resources and the 
opportunity to learn from previous explorations, the last mission led to 
catastrophic loss of life and prestige for the British Empire. This section 
examines why. Figure 3.5 shows the Venn diagram representing the key risks 
arising in this case. 
Franklin was the exploration leader, although it is not clear how far he influenced 
the decision to conduct the final survey by sea rather than overland. Other actors 
include the crew, while the main stakeholders were the British Admiralty, 
spending monies on behalf of the nation‟s taxpayers, and his wife, Lady Franklin 
who made a personal investment. The search for the Northwest Passage 
involved many expeditions beyond those involving Franklin. These are not 
discussed here as they are deemed independent of the events that influenced 
the risks of this mission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Franklin, as supreme commander, was responsible for decisions made during 
the mission. As a military man he has been criticized because he adhered to 
official regulation in circumstances which put his crew at risk. This contrast 
between the two early missions and the last is interesting because it illustrates a 
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Figure 3.5 – Venn Diagram of 1845 Franklin Mission Depicting Key 
Risk Classes 
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change in the model assumed by the explorers. The early missions were driven 
by the goal to generate trade, while the 1845 mission was driven by the 
communicated goal of scientific discovery, which might arguably have been 
masking an intended political goal. This shift in goals between the decades is 
accompanied by a divergence in the set of assumptions made and the reality of 
the mission.  For example, the early missions were conducted in collaboration 
with people and methods familiar with the region, while the latter was very much 
a military affair with an apparent over-provision of the supporting comforts and 
reliance on new technology relative to the investment in understanding of the 
environment in which the mission would take place. The lack of priority given to 
the latter is evidence that they not only did not learn but that they actually 
“unlearned” good practice from the past.   
The 1845 mission was beset by operational difficulties, including poorer 
environmental conditions than the norm for the region and contaminated 
provisions. The former contributed to the failure to progress the mission and the 
latter appears to have had direct and indirect effects on the ability to abort the 
mission successfully.  Considerable investment was made in the novel 
technology for this mission but less attention given to the routine quality control 
of basic provisions. The solution to loss of the mission was to allocate 
considerable resources to act, and to be seen to act, in recovery of the crew.   
The 1845 mission could be classed as successful against the stated goal of 
trying to track the Northwest Passage – largely because it was traced by John 
Rae while involved in the search for Franklin.  However the consequences were 
high in terms of loss if life, financial investment and damaged reputation at the 
height of Britain‟s so-called imperial century. 
3.5.10 Key References 
Delgado J P (1999) Across the Top of the World: The Quest for the Northwest 
Passage, British Museum Press 
 
3.6 Antarctic Voyages of Sir Ernest Shackleton (1901-1916) 
3.6.1 Summary 
Sir Ernest Shackleton was one of the last great individual explorers. At a time 
when most of the earth had been discovered and charted, Shackleton attempted 
to explore Antarctica. Whilst his exploration was ultimately a failure, his battle 
against adversity and the triumphant safe return of his twenty seven-man crew 
was seen as a huge success. In comparison, the story of his partner voyager, 
who successfully laid food depots for Shackleton‟s land trek but lost three men in 
the process, is largely untold.  
3.6.2 Mission Goals 
The aim of the Imperial-Trans Antarctic Expedition was twofold. First, to carry 
the British flag across the continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean 
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via the South Pole and second, to conduct a number of scientific experiments, 
which could be carried out during the voyage. 
3.6.3 Context 
At the turn of the 20th century, very few parts of the earth lay unexplored. One 
such place was the South Pole. Britain, Japan, Germany, Sweden, Norway, 
France and Belgium all took an interest in the continent and began a race to see 
who would be first to plant their flag on the South Pole. 
3.6.4 Concept 
Prior to the Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition, Shackleton had been on one 
expedition led by Robert Scott and led another of his own. The British National 
Antarctic Expedition, led by Scott, lasted for Shackleton from 31 July 1901 till 28 
February 1902. The primary aim of this mission was to carry out scientific 
research along the coast of the Ross Sea – however Scott harbored hopes of 
reaching the South Pole. For Shackleton, however, the mission was not a 
success. The relationship between Shackleton and Scott was strained from the 
beginning of the expedition. Where Scott was trained in the Royal Navy and 
expected high levels of discipline, Shackleton preferred to use camaraderie to 
motivate the men. Scott, Shackleton and Edward Wilson attempted to reach the 
pole, ending up within 533 miles of the pole before giving up, partially due to 
Shackleton‟s ill health. On 28 February 1902, Scott sent Shackleton home on the 
grounds of ill health despite the fact that by this point, he had almost fully 
recovered.  
On returning, Shackleton began to put in place steps to lead his own expedition. 
On 1 January 1908, the British Imperial Antarctic Expedition began, led by 
Shackleton on the Nimrod. As before, the aim was to lead a small party of men 
to the South Pole. Again, the mission was unsuccessful, however Shackleton 
was to reach closer to the South Pole than anyone else until in 1911, the 
Norwegian, Amundsen, and then 33 days later, Scott and his British party 
reached the South Pole.  
Despite the fact that the South Pole had been reached by Amundsen and Scott, 
there was still much interest in supporting expeditions to the South Pole. 
Shackleton managed to raise funding for the expedition through the British 
Government, the Royal Geographical Society, a number of private smaller 
sources and in particular, James Key Caird; who was the largest single donator. 
Shackleton acquired two ships for the voyage – Endurance and Aurora. In 
addition, he had no trouble in gaining interest in the expedition - receiving over 
5000 applicants for a total of 56 positions.   
3.6.5 Exploration 
On 8th August 1914, Endurance, set sail with 28 men onboard. The plan was for 
Endurance to reach the Atlantic coast of Antarctica and to begin to move across 
land, via the South Pole to the Pacific coast. The supporting party in the Aurora 
would land on the Pacific Coast of Antarctica and leave depots to provide 
support for the last portion of the on-land trek. Endurance arrived on South 
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Georgia, took on the last of their supplies and began to move south towards the 
Antarctic.  
For the first couple of months, the Endurance made fair speed, however, the ice 
conditions gradually worsened. The Endurance sporadically became caught in 
ice, unable to move. Initially, however, Shackleton was unconcerned about the 
ship being stuck. He was aware that it was normal for ships to be caught in ice, 
only to be released at a later time. Shackleton later regretted not making an 
early spring landing – however, in hindsight, he may have made the correct 
decision.  
On 17th January 1915, the ship became surrounded in ice. The ship began to be 
carried first South-West and then North-West by currents. On January 24th, the 
ship was 60 miles from Vashel Bay – the projected point of landing. As before, 
Shackleton was initially unfazed by the development. It was not till 14th February 
that Shackleton began to take measures to cut the ship free from the ice. On 24th 
February, the crew of the Endurance buckled down for the winter. Knowing they 
were unlikely to be freed the scientists continued to work, but life became 
uneventful for most of the crew.  
By 31st March, the ship had moved 95 miles North-West; however, it was not 
until July that the ice began to put pressure on the ship and on the 24th July, the 
crew made plans for an emergency abandonment of the ship. On October 24th, 
the ship began to buckle, on the 27th the order was given to abandon the ship 
and on 21st November, Endurance finally sank. The crew was able to scavenge 
three lifeboats, sledges and a large amount of provisions prior to the ship 
sinking. At this point, achieving the goal of reaching the South Pole and beyond 
was unrealistic and the goal became one of survival and returning home. 
Shackleton began to move the crew across the ice floe and onto land; however, 
his first two attempts were unsuccessful.  
On 9th April, the floe broke up and the party began to move again by sea. This 
gave them increased maneuverability, but ultimately forced Shackleton to make 
a decision regarding their future direction. He chose to head towards Deception 
Island; however, after only a few days at sea, the conditions were clearly too 
much for the lifeboats and they made their way to Elephant Island. Upon landing, 
the crew settled down and Shackleton again began to plan for the future. 
Elephant Island was not located anywhere near where the crew was expected to 
be and was not on common shipping routes. Rescue from here was unlikely. 
The island was barren other than for some seals and penguins which offered 
food and blubber to the men. 
Shackleton decided that moving all the men at once on three lifeboats was 
unlikely to be successful. Instead, he picked six men to sail from Elephant Island 
to South Georgia – a distance of 800 miles known as Drake Passage. The 
Falkland Islands were closer; however, the winds made this a more difficult 
journey. Drake Passage is considered amongst the most dangerous in the world 
and winds of up to 40 miles per hour are experienced on average of 200 days 
per year. He knew the dangers of Drake Passage and only packed for four 
weeks of rations – knowing that if the journey lasted longer than four weeks; the 
lifeboat was unlikely to be intact. He was constantly worried about the morale of 
his men and chose to take along Harry McNish, who Shackleton considered 
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disruptive. McNish and other members of the crew began to strengthen the 
James Caird lifeboat; preparing it for the journey ahead.  
Aboard the James Caird, named after the largest donator, the six men set sail 
for South Georgia. After fourteen nights at sea, the crew spotted land – however 
in order to avoid a night time landing, they waited at sea. That night, the boat 
was subjected to hurricane-force winds and the crew barely survived. Frank 
Worsley later wrote that a 500-ton steamer had been lost in the same storm. The 
next day, the James Caird landed on South Georgia.  
However, they were on the southern unpopulated side of the island and needed 
to cross 20 miles of uncharted territory. Due to poor weather conditions, the crew 
was given an enforced rest for 9 days. Two of the crew where unfit to travel 
across such inhospitable terrain and a third crew member was left to care for 
them. On the 19th May at 2am, Shackleton, Worsley and Tom Crean set off to 
reach one of the whaling stations on the north side of the island. The journey 
took 36 hours – an impressive time that is difficult to match even today. Once 
they reached the whaling station, the three-man party on the south side of the 
island were picked up the next day. 
Unknown to Shackleton, his marooned men on Elephant Island had found 
sufficient food to last them several more weeks. Therefore, he immediately 
began to put in place measures to rescue them. The danger of the journey they 
had just taken is highlighted by the fact that it took 4 attempts to reach the party. 
World War I had broken out in and Britain was unable to send any support for six 
months. Shackleton was eventually successful reaching the party using a 
Chilean steamer for transport. After 4 ½ months away from his crew, Shackleton 
was finally able to rescue all 22 men in late August. 
3.6.6 Dissolution 
At the same time, the Aurora ship was continuing its way to the Pacific coast of 
Antarctica in order to lay supply depots for Shackleton‟s land trek. Despite the 
fact that the Aurora, after landing the ten man supply party, was blown off 
course, stuck in ice and drifted for a total of 283 days, the mission was 
successful and depots were left for Shackleton. Once it was freed, the ship 
sailed to New Zealand to be repaired.  
3.6.7 Key Statistics 
Table 3.5 shows key statistics for Shackleton and the Ross Sea Party.  The 
implications of these statistics will be examined in the following section.  
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Table 3.5 – Key Statistics for Shackleton and Ross Sea Party 
 Number of 
Outgoing 
Ships 
Number of 
People 
Number of 
Ships 
returned 
Number of 
Men 
Returned 
Mission 
Success 
Shackleton 
Party 
1 28 0 28 Failure 
Ross Sea 
Party 
1 28 1 25 Success 
3.6.8 Risk Lessons Learned 
There were a number of risks encountered and overcome during the mission. 
Due to the previous successful exploration of the waters around Antarctica, the 
types of waters that they would encounter were well known. Shackleton had 
been in the area in two previous voyages and potentially underestimated the 
threat posed by the ice. He was largely unconcerned when they were initially 
caught in the ice and may have lost opportunities to identify a suitable landing 
spot.  
Due to the popularity of the mission and the fact that Shackleton was able to 
hand pick the crew; he was able to select a mixture of very qualified and 
experienced crewmen. When they encountered problems, it is likely that being 
surrounded by a qualified crew helped to overcome issues that other crews may 
have suffered with. For example, the lifeboat had to be modified in preparation 
for the voyage to South Georgia. Without the experience of his crew to be 
flexible and adapt to new goals, it is possible that they would have been unable 
to meet those goals. 
Other risks were the lack of communication between the two parties. At this time, 
radio communication could only be conducted over a relatively short distance. 
The distance between the ships was such that there was no communication 
between both parties. Due to this lack of communication, the Ross Sea party 
continued with their mission despite the fact that Shackleton‟s party had failed. 
We can apply the DSRM, Figure 3.2 to the Shackleton case study. Shackleton 
had already been on two Antarctic missions and so was aware of what could be 
achieved. From this, he was able to provide incentives to his crew to align the 
goals. These incentives were neither money nor a chance for a new start in life, 
as in previous cases, but instead the incentive of adventure. He was able to 
hand pick highly competent men to join him due to the vast response he 
received. In this case, the unwanted event was losing the ship – which forced 
the goals of the mission to change from exploration to survival. This created 
highly motivated crew all working towards a common goal which, combined with 
their high skill level, ultimately led to the survival of the entire crew. 
3.6.9 Key Reading 
Hayes J.G. (1932) The Conquest of the South Pole, Thornton Butterworth, 
London. 
Huntford R (1985) Shackleton, Hachette Livre UK Company.  
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3.7 Project Apollo (1961-1972) 
3.7.1 Summary 
From the famous speech of President Kennedy in May of 1961 to the final 
landing on the moon in 1972, Project Apollo was a rapidly expedited and highly 
successful exploration mission. We shall sketch the main events, but since these 
are well known and comprehensively documented5 our purpose is not primarily 
to go over known facts, but to organize them in a way that fits into and illustrates 
aspects of the comparative framework used for other cases. In particular we 
shall make a broad-brush comparison of the US and Soviet manned lunar 
efforts, consider in what ways strategic risks were mitigated by looking at the 
wider political decision making context, and finally illustrate that even the most 
familiar and recent historical events have been shaped by chance events.   
3.7.2 Mission Goal 
On 25th May 1961, President Kennedy made a speech before a Joint Session of 
Congress defining the overall Mission Goal: 
I believe that this Nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this 
decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safety to earth.  
This objective, defined in the context of a Soviet lead in space, was the signal for 
a huge investment in the newly formed NASA. However, it was also a clearly 
defined and limited goal. 
3.7.3 Context 
A large part of the scene-setting is at a social and political level. The decision to 
go to the moon cannot be divorced from the political tensions of the time, from 
the Cold War, and from superpower rivalry. The survival of the Soviet Union in 
the war, the rapid progress it was making in industrialization and education, and 
the technological progress that it was making (as illustrated by its rapid 
development of nuclear weaponry, the first test explosion taking place in 1949) 
gave confidence to the Soviet leadership that history was, as Khrushchev was 
reported to have said, “on their side”.  
At the end of WW II, the arms race between East and West began in earnest. 
The strategic importance of rocketry was clear as illustrated by the move of most 
German rocket scientists to the US, where they worked largely for the Army. 
Each of the US military services had R&D programs in missile development: the 
USAF was given primary responsibility for the development of ICBMs; the Army 
was involved in the development of shorter range missiles (but with the technical 
capability through its German rocket scientists to do more); and the Navy with its 
interest in the benefits of satellite communication and navigation was interested 
in developing the capability of launching satellites. The extensive rivalry between 
the services has been well documented – each vying for primary or shared 
responsibility for space research and development.  
                                               
5
 For example, the NASA website and the work of Stephen Dick, the NASA Chief Historian, gives a 
comprehensive coverage of the Apollo events 
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This rivalry came to a head during the preparations for the US contribution to the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY; was in fact 18 months, from 1 July 1957 to 
31 December 1958). The IGY, organized by the International Council of 
Scientific Unions (ICSU), is a good illustration of the way the scientific 
community can take initiatives to force the pace of international scientific and 
technological progress. Both the US and the USSR were interested in launching 
a satellite as part of the IGY.  In the US, the National Security Council ordered 
the DoD to start a program for such a satellite with support from the National 
Science Foundation (NSF). All three services came forward with proposals for a 
launcher: the Naval Research Laboratory had developed its Viking rocket; the 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) proposed using its Redstone launcher 
(developed by Von Braun and his team from the V2 missile) in what they called 
“Project Orbiter”; and the Air Force proposed using an Atlas ICBM launcher. 
Based on reasonable criteria, but on an assessment of those criteria that in 
hindsight looks to have been incorrect, the Navy was selected. Unfortunately the 
Navy‟s “Project Vanguard” was beset with technical and funding problems. Only 
after the second Sputnik launch was the ABMA launcher brought in as an 
alternative, leading to the first successful launch of a US satellite in January 
1958, nearly 4 months after the first Sputnik.  
Sputnik I and II had a large impact on the American public and their politicians, 
but the line taken by the Eisenhower administration was that there was no 
particular significance. In strictly rational terms this was correct – the Russian‟s 
ICBM capability was not new, there was no short term military significance of 
launching the satellite, and the US had almost the same capability (the minor 
difference being that it was not a proven capability). However, in what could now 
be considered a case study in social risk amplification, the media, politicians in 
the Senate and Congress, and the public themselves created a real political 
storm in which action was unavoidable. Senate majority leader Johnson was 
perhaps the key person to understand that the rules of the political game had 
changed. While Eisenhower was satisfied that there were no significant military 
implications and saw a satellite launch as a purely scientific mission to be 
justified on purely scientific grounds, Johnson saw Sputnik significance as a 
highly visible symbol of USSR power (or rather, lack of US power) in the domain 
of science and technology. It was also a very clear statement of capability – with 
implications for military capability - that had previously not been widely known. 
Now many ordinary Americans knew what Sputnik was, and this affected their 
perceptions about the position of the US. 
NASA came into being in October 1958 after a difficult debate within the 
government about the primacy between civilian and military space programs. 
The decision to place space under a civilian agency became important later 
because it meant that the moon race was not a military competition. 
The political situation changed rapidly after the election of Kennedy, with the 
embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs and the first human space flight by Gagarin. 
The time was ripe for the new President to take a bold step that would 
demonstrate his ability to control events and the US‟ ability to provide a 
technological lead.  
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3.7.4 Concept 
The desire to reach the moon has been around for a long time, probably for as 
long as mankind has had an awareness of the moon‟s existence. Long before 
space flight was possible, space travel was being popularized in literature and 
on film. However, the fact that space travel had captured the popular imagination 
did not mean that it was technically, or politically feasible. Prior to Kennedy‟s 
speech however, the scientific community had put space flight firmly onto the 
political agenda through the IGY initiative. The German rocket scientists led by 
von Braun had apparently chosen to go the US at least partly because of a 
sense that they would have greater scope for manned space flight. Finally, 
manned space flight, leading to a mission to the moon was on the agenda 
proposed by the newly formed NASA. 
After its formation, NASA had been given responsibility for the Mercury program, 
and the development was proceeding relatively quickly. The launcher was the 
Redstone developed by ABMA which had been through a number of successful 
launch tests, but which was now to be used for the first manned US space flight. 
The Redstone was eventually further developed into the J2, and the technology 
developed ultimately used in the development of the Saturn V launcher. At this 
point, prior to the Gagarin launch, there was still a lot of uncertainty about the 
human body‟s physical endurance to launch and reentry. A number of animal 
tests, together with the known animal flights carried out by the Russians and 
tests performed on the pilots, gave sufficient assurance that an astronaut could 
survive the journey. The first manned mission was planned for March 1961, 
which was prior to Gagarin‟s mission. However, the von Braun team was still 
cautious about the launcher and insisted on an additional test firing. This was 
successful, but the Russians were able to claim the first manned flight.  
The successful manned flight underlined Russian leadership in space and was 
seen by Kennedy as a political challenge. Although Kennedy had little 
knowledge of space issues, his Vice President Johnson had already spent a 
considerable time devoted to the subject and knew many of the key players. On 
20 April 1961, Kennedy appointed Johnson as Chair of the Space Council and 
sent him a memo asking for an inquiry into a number of questions, of which the 
first was: 
1. Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, 
or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket 
to go to the moon and back with a man. Is there any other space program which 
promises dramatic results in which we could win?6 
It is clear that for Kennedy the question was simply one of national prestige. His 
scientific advisor, Wiesner, described later what Kennedy had told him about the 
decision to go to the moon: 
                                               
6
 Quote in Logsdon (1970) 
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Well it’s your fault. If you had a scientific spectacular on this earth that would be 
more useful – say desalting the ocean – or something that is just as dramatic 
and convincing as space, then we would do it.7 
It is clear that Kennedy‟s interest in the space program was as a vehicle for 
regaining national prestige. The choice had to be for a goal that was dramatic, 
that was feasible and that the US would achieve before the Soviets. Johnson 
took soundings from a number of different experts, but a particularly important 
and influential one was von Braun, at the time Director of the Marshall Space 
Center, but writing in a personal capacity: 
 we have a sporting chance of sending a 3-man crew around the moon 
ahead of the Soviets...an excellent chance of beating the Soviets to the first 
landing of a crew on the moon (including return capability).....because a 
performance jump by a factor of 10 over their present rockets is necessary to 
accomplish this feat 
One of the principal reasons for the “excellent chance” was the development, 
headed by von Braun, of a heavy lift capability. This development, which went on 
to contribute to Saturn V, was already far advanced before the Apollo program 
was agreed. Indeed, von Braun‟s group seems to have gone so far that that 
there was no immediate military need for the Saturn class, and the DoD had 
agreed to transfer the team to the newly formed NASA.  
From the perspective of Kennedy then, the goal to land on the moon was one 
that met all of his desiderata: The US could and would get there first, and this 
would be a striking demonstration of US technological superiority. The perceived 
technological feasibility and indeed the potential advantage were both key to the 
setting of the goal by Kennedy. Without the cold war context providing the need, 
and the technological advantage providing the strong probability of a win, it is not 
clear that Kennedy would have set the goal and Lunar exploration might have 
been placed in the slow lane. 
3.7.5 Exploration 
The Apollo program consisted of a large number of unmanned test flights 
together with 11 manned missions: There were two manned missions in Earth 
orbit, two in lunar orbit, six missions which landed on the moon, and a further 
mission (Apollo 13) which was unable to carry out its planned landing but which 
returned after a lunar swing-by. 
The preparatory manned missions were intended to demonstrate various 
subsystems: Apollo 7 demonstrated the Command Module function and 
Command/Service Module rendezvous capability. Apollo 8 was the first manned 
launch using the Saturn V rocket, and the first to orbit the moon, thus providing 
experience of manned flight over that distance and providing detailed images of 
the lunar surface. Apollo 9 was used to qualify the Lunar Module and test 
docking with the Command Module. An almost full “dry run” of the landing 
mission was carried out with Apollo 10. All functions, including orbits of the lunar 
module, except the actual landing were carried out.  
                                               
7
 Quote in Logsdon (1970) 
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On January 27, 1967 during a launch pad test for the AS-204 mission, a flash 
fire occurred in the command module, killing the three astronauts, Grissom, 
White and Chaffee. Besides the tragic loss of life, the fire caused a delay to the 
whole program while the Board of Inquiry carried out its work. That report 
revealed many design, planning and manufacturing problems and gave many 
recommendations that vastly improved the safety of the systems. As such it was 
an unwanted, but vital opportunity for the whole NASA organization to learn and 
raise its game. In addition to these direct benefits however, the delay also gave 
the other parts of the Apollo project some extra breathing space. The overall 
objective had been set to a very tight schedule.  
The other very public failure during the Apollo program was the Apollo 13 flight. 
Through the ingenuity of its staff, NASA was able to turn this potential disaster 
into its “finest hour”. Lessons again were learnt, in this case related to quality 
management.  
Alongside the American space effort, the Russians were still active. Von Braun‟s 
claim that the US had an excellent chance of beating the Russians to a moon 
landing was of course vindicated, but there were strong efforts made by the 
Russians to compete – though little was known about this at the time.  
A heavy lift launcher, the N1 was proposed in 1960 by Korolev, who later also 
sought and was given permission to attempt a manned lunar landing. Chelomey, 
one of his rivals, was given permission to attempt a circumlunar mission, using 
an alternative launcher (later known as the Proton). The Soviet space effort, 
however, was military, and this restricted funds for what was seen as a purely 
political objective. Korolev‟s program was hampered by problems arising from 
lack of clear political prioritization and funding. Arguments over propellant choice 
led to the loss of the most experienced rocket engine designer Glushko: Korolev 
wanted a LOX/kerosene engine while Glushko wanted to use storable 
propellants (UDMH/N2O4) which would have direct military applications. 
Glushko‟s replacement was Kuznetsov, an able aircraft engine designer, but 
inexperienced as rocket engine designer.   
The program, hampered already by lack of funds and disagreement about goals, 
was further set back by the death of Korolev in 1966. He was succeeded by his 
deputy Mishin, who planned a manned circumlunar mission to take place just 
prior to Apollo 8. The whole program was struck by a series of launch failures, 
including the second N1 test in which much of the launch facilities were 
destroyed. The program was later cancelled after the US had won the moon 
race, and without the N1 ever having been successfully launched.  
3.7.6  Dissolution 
The rapid promotion of manned space flight to a national strategic priority was 
matched by its fall in political priority after the achievement of Kennedy‟s goal. 
Budget cuts led to the cancellation of three planned flights (Apollo 18-21). 
Fifteen Saturn V rockets had been constructed – one was used for Skylab, and 
another two became exhibits.  
Kennedy‟s goal had been achieved, and to many outside the space sector, there 
seemed little point in making expensive journeys to a place that did not deliver 
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palpable benefits. The main motivation was now science, and this could be done 
more cheaply in different ways. Instead, there was more to be gained by 
developing the use of space closer to Earth. 
3.7.7 Risk Lessons Learned 
So much has already been written about Apollo from a technical and project 
management point of view that we do not feel it useful to go over those aspects 
in detail. Instead we shall concentrate on the more strategic aspects.  
The most important aspect is how the goal came to be set. Kennedy needed a 
way to demonstrate national prowess, but this need not have been in space if 
some other goal had been available, and would not have been a manned lunar 
landing unless he had been fairly sure that the US could get there first. A 
simplified reading of the situation would suggest that the scientific and 
technological communities simply “hitched a ride” by providing Kennedy with the 
goal he was looking for. To some extent this is true, but it also ignores the role of 
those communities in two other ways: 
 The development of space as an area for superpower competition, 
stimulated by the scientific community‟s promotion of the IGY; 
 The provision of key enabling technology that assured a-priori a high 
chance of success, and a relative competitor disadvantage.  
Hence, while the scientific and technological communities do not set the agenda, 
they can quite effectively determine what is on it. 
A second key aspect is the role of competition. Human institutions are driven 
largely by competition – whether this is competition for basic resources or for 
more abstract aspects such as prestige. While geopolitical superpower 
competition was the main driver for the political prioritization of the Apollo 
project, competition between emerging institutions played a key role elsewhere. 
One example is the way that competition between the US Military Services led to 
different launch systems and technologies, despite the efforts of the DoD to 
coordinate and spend money efficiently. The relative freedom available was 
used in particular by von Braun‟s group with the development of cryogenic 
launcher technology. That this - from a purely military point of view – could be 
seen as dubious use of resources is illustrated by the problems that Korolev had 
in the Soviet Union.  
Human competition takes places within an (emerging) framework. An important 
element in the moon race was civilian control of NASA. Besides allowing the 
prioritization of civilian goals above military ones, it enabled Kennedy to “safely” 
use space as an area for superpower competition. Had the US space effort been 
led by a military organization it is quite likely that the Soviet military would have 
more heavily prioritized its own efforts, because they would have seen the moon 
race as a military competition. In this particular case civilian control in the US 
and military control in the Soviet Union gave a competitive advantage to the US. 
These strategic issues can be represented within a Strategic and Program level 
Dynamic Systemic Risk model. This is shown in Figure 3.6. 
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Starting prior to Kennedy‟s goal setting speech, key stakeholders were aware of 
the competitors activity and were assessing this in different ways: political 
stakeholders were sensitive to the loss of leadership of the US, while technical 
stakeholders were assessing the US position as close and in some areas ahead 
of the USSR. These key stakeholder perceptions were formative for the strategic 
goal setting. However, the main strategic goals were political, rather exploration 
goals.  Therefore the prospect of program success (as held out by von Braun) 
was a major factor in selecting the goal. This was Kennedy‟s strategic level risk 
mitigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The setting of tight program goals gave rise to a highly motivated and directed 
program leadership, who became emboldened through early successes. The 
Apollo 1 fire was a significant unwanted event that led to severe reassessment 
of project organization. Through the relatively open and transparent US political 
system, key stakeholders were quickly aware of the problems, but in this case 
the tightness of the overall goal meant that no strategic changes were made. 
Success of the Apollo program meant that the program leadership was looking 
to increase the overall scope, and indeed had always wanted to carry out further 
lunar exploration. However, the strategic level goals were simple and motivated 
Figure 3.6 – Program and Strategic Level Dynamic Systemic-Risk Model 
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primarily by political rather than exploration objectives. By successfully landing a 
man on the moon and returning him safely to earth, before the Soviets had 
managed to do this, the strategic goals were met, and the support of key 
stakeholders for wider strategic exploration objectives was not forthcoming. 
Hence, viewed from the point of view of exploration, Apollo was a strategic 
failure because it did not place the US in a position from which it could easily 
move to the next stage of exploration. Indeed, it represented from this 
perspective – perhaps inevitably – a dead end. 
Finally it is clear that Kennedy‟s goal setting came at a time in which political and 
technical agendas were uniquely aligned. Historical events, which helped align 
those agendas were therefore key to making Kennedy‟s decision happen. Two 
such events are, paradoxically, early failures of the US space effort – allowing 
the Soviets to be first with a satellite and with manned flight. Both these failures 
were narrow – the US Army claimed that it could have launched before Sputnik, 
and it was von Braun‟s extra Redstone test flight that postponed the first US 
manned flight until after Gagarin (admittedly, the US flight would have not been 
orbital, but this distinction may well have been lost on the general public and on 
most politicians). Therefore one could plausibly argue – though it must remain 
speculation – that the US narrowly missed the Soviets on two occasions, and 
that US successes there might have reduced the political imperative for action 
so much that the Apollo program would not have been give as high a priority.  
After the US decision to go to the moon, we have seen that the Soviet leadership 
made half hearted efforts to compete. We also noted that, had NASA been a 
military organization, the Soviet armed forces may well have had a very different 
view of their strategic priorities. Under these circumstances there might have 
been a very competitive race to get to the moon, notwithstanding von Braun‟s 
assessment of Soviet chances. 
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4 Overarching Discussion of Risk Themes 
The cases discussed above provide a range of different exploration and 
colonization projects dating from the 15th to the 20th Century. The purpose of this 
chapter is to draw together the common elements into a framework that can then 
be used to consider where modern risk management techniques can help us for 
future projects, and where there are gaps.  
4.1 Motivation for Exploration 
The first issue is to consider the motivations for exploration throughout these 
cases. The costs of exploration have always been relatively high, and have 
meant that explorations are carried out by or on behalf of institutions (usually 
nation states). The motivations of the sponsors differ markedly from those of the 
actual explorers. In general the explorers have a personal drive to go into the 
unknown, even when the odds of personal survival are not great. The sponsors 
on the other hand are looking for tangible benefits in the form of prosperity, 
security, or political advantage. However, many of these benefits are constrained 
– there are only limited numbers of locations with oil, gold etc, There is 
competition to acquire these assets, and either a desire to gain if you are first or 
a fear to lose out if you are following. Scientific expeditions are slightly different 
because the desire for new knowledge leads to benefits in terms of increased 
scientific understanding. However, it is difficult (as many Universities today 
know) to commercialize and gain more tangible benefits from such knowledge 
because it is available to all. In fact there is a free rider problem – those who do 
not pay still get access to the scientific knowledge.  
It is worth reflecting further on the differences between those expeditions which 
are really leading (desire to gain) and those which follow on (fear to lose). Those 
who are following know that certain things are now possible, and can benefit 
from that knowledge. In technical terms, “unknown unknowns” are converted into 
“known unknowns”. An example of this is the flight of Alan Shepard coming after 
the flight of Gagarin which confirmed that humans could really survive launch 
and reentry.  A historical example is that Cabot felt able to make the journey to 
America with just one ship – based on Columbus, he knew there was land, and 
he knew roughly how long he would have to travel.  On the other hand, those 
being driven by the fear to lose are often in a state of crisis, and may therefore 
exhibit poorer decision-making, as in the case of Darien, or even with Apollo 
(until after the Apollo 1 accident).  
4.2 Comparative Findings 
Table 4.1 gives a summary, for each of the cases we have studies, of 
motivations, costs, and outcomes at program and strategic levels. See Section 
2.2.5 for an explanation of how the present day costs were calculated using a 
GDP deflator. See Appendix 3 for further information on how these costs were 
calculated.  
The table shows that political or economic benefits have been sought, even on 
those expeditions with a scientific character. As one might expect, given that we 
have covered a range of different mission types on a range of different scales, 
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there is no particular pattern in the number of ships involved and the numbers 
lost. 
 
lost.  
 Driver Benefits No. of 
Ships 
Outward 
No. of 
Ships 
Lost 
No. of 
People 
No. of 
People 
Lost 
Estimated 
Present 
Day Cost 
using GDP 
Deflator  
Program 
Outcome 
Strategic 
Outcome 
Columbus  Desire 
for 
gain  
Prosperity  13 5 ~400 39 £320,000  
Exploitation 
rights  
Failure Success 
Cabot Fear 
to 
Lose 
Prosperity 6 4 ? ? £408,000 
Exploitation 
rights  
Failure Failure 
Raleigh  Fear 
to lose  
Prosperity 
Political  
10 1 226 Min. 
109 
~£6.8M  
Exploitation 
rights 
Failure Failure 
Darien Fear 
to lose  
Prosperity  17 16 ~2500 ~2470 ~£63M  Failure Failure 
Franklin  
(1845) 
Desire 
for 
gain  
Political 
Scientific  
5 5 134 134 ~£2M  Failure Success 
Shackleton Desire 
for 
gain 
Scientific 1 1 28 0 ~£600K  Failure Failure 
Apollo  
(1-17 
without 2 -
6) 
Fear 
to lose  
Political 
Scientific  
12 1 36 3 ~£70 B  Success Failure 
 
In terms of costs, it is noteworthy that Cabot‟s expedition was privately funded. 
Cabot had to gain the support of the King only so that he could obtain a 
guarantee of future exploitation rights. Without such a guarantee anyone could 
have stepped in to benefit from his investment. Of course, there was no 
international law and no jurisdiction over the new lands except that asserted by 
European sovereigns and the Pope. They had to be careful about exercising that 
jurisdiction as conflicts could only be resolved, ultimately, by war. Hence King 
William‟s politically motivated resolve not to support the Darien colony, despite 
its establishment by his own subjects.  
The table shows that only Apollo was successful at a programmatic level in 
achieving its initial goal. Columbus was a strategic success because, although 
he did not find a route to Asia, he did, in a more general sense, achieve his 
strategic goals of finding new lands and creating new trading possibilities for his 
sponsors. Franklin was a strategic success because his mission led to the 
Table 4.1 – Summary of Motivations, Costs and Success of Cases 
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successful discovery of the North West Passage. We have classified Apollo as a 
strategic failure from the point of view of exploration, as it closed off an avenue 
of exploration rather than opening up new exploration ventures. However it 
should be said that from a political point of view Apollo was a strategic success, 
as it helped to reestablish the perception of US technological pre-eminence.  
We have not considered public opinion in assessing whether exploration 
ventures are considered successes or failures. Public perception is of course 
notoriously fickle, and driven by many factors. In particular the successful 
struggle against adversity, when the mission is a failure, but human survival is 
(partially) achieved has been important in forming public perception of some 
missions – most notably Shackleton, and Apollo 13. This contributes positively to 
overall perception of the program (as with Apollo 13) despite the failure at 
mission level. 
4.3 A Common Risk Framework 
With such a range of different exploration ventures over widely different time 
periods, any attempt to provide a common risk framework is necessarily broad 
brush. Nevertheless, we can still gain useful insights. As discussed above, and 
shown in Figure 2.4 we generated a set of generic risk categories at mission, 
program and strategic level.  Definitions for these risks are given in Table 2.2. 
In some sense the False Model and Self-interest of Actors risks are quite 
fundamental, relating as they do to how we make sense of the information we 
receive, and how we deal with the fact that our organizations are built from 
individuals who are able to make their own decisions. False model and Self 
interest of Actors also affect some of the other risks shown in Figure 2.4, for 
example by affecting the organizations ability to learn from data it obtains. The 
influences between different risks, and their impact on mission, program and 
strategic level success are shown in Figure 2.5.  
In order to assess how the different risks impacted on each case, we first took 
the most significant events relating to the venture and decisions of crew, 
leadership and stakeholders, and produced a Risk Experience Diagram. The 
diagrams for each case are included as appendices. We have consciously 
attempted to ensure a similar level of detail was used for different ventures. The 
diagrams represent the major events described in the narrative, and do not go 
into a detailed technical level. By counting the different types of risks that 
occurred in each diagram we were able to assess the relative impact of different 
types of risk on the exploration ventures. The overall risk count is summarized in 
Table 4.2 
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 Mission Failure Program Failure Strategic Failure 
 Internal 
Events 
Leadership 
decisions 
External 
Events 
Lack of 
Learning 
Resourcing Stake-
holder 
perception 
Goal 
change 
Self 
interest 
of 
actors 
False 
model 
Columbus 0 2 1 2 0 3 1 8 1 
Raleigh 0 3 1 0 2 0 3 6 2 
Darien 0 0 6 0 0 6 2 1 4 
Franklin 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 1 
Shackleton 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 1 2 
Apollo 0 2 1 0 0 7 2 0 0 
Total 2 8 11 3 2 20 11 18 10 
 
Table 4.2 shows that, across the cases considered, strategic risks are 
numerically more significant than program or mission risks. Furthermore, self-
interest of actors and false model have been significant, though not on Apollo.  
We suggest that self-interest of actors was insignificant in Apollo because of the 
very tightly defined goals and timescale, which did not allow for significant 
divergence within the organization. We suggest that false model was not a 
significant problem partly because of the high investment in science and 
technology and because (again) of the limited goals and the short time span. 
One can only speculate that these issues might be significant in longer lasting 
programs with international consortia.  
Of course, one of the clear differences between modern and historical 
exploration ventures is that we now have a host of modern management tools 
available to assess and (should we so choose) mitigate risks. Hence we can 
legitimately ask whether the historical stories would have been different – in 
terms of the risk count given above – if they had had the benefit of modern 
management techniques. This question is of course impossible to answer with 
any certainty.  However, it is certainly the case that the individuals involved in all 
of these ventures were extremely professional, and therefore presumably carried 
out informal risk assessments even if these were not carried out with the rigor 
and completeness that modern techniques would imply. If, furthermore, we 
consider the scope of modern analysis techniques then we see that mission level 
risks are typically analyzed with Technical Risk Analysis methods. At the 
program level, risk mitigation is informed using techniques belonging to 
Programmatic Risk Management. At strategic level we do not yet have a well 
defined body of techniques designed to analyze this level of risk. 
Given that the predominant risks observed in the Risk Experience Diagrams are 
at the strategic rather than mission or program levels, our conclusion must be 
Table 4.2 – Summary of Risk Count 
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that modern risk management techniques would not have addressed the 
dominant risks appearing in the cases we have studied.  
Clearly we must also conclude that future exploration ventures are also 
susceptible to strategic risks, however well the mission and program level risk 
analysis and mitigation functions are carried out.  
4.4 Overall Dynamic Systemic Risk Model 
We have observed that human decision making dynamics are significant at 
mission, program and strategic level, though the most important dynamics may 
be at one level or another, depending on the case. We can combine the different 
levels together in an overall model as shown in Figure 4.1 
The inner loop describes the motivations experience and activities of the crew, 
that is, it describes mission level dynamics. The middle loop describes program 
level decisions and motivations, including ways in which the program leadership 
can intervene to influence those operating at mission level. Finally, the outer loop 
represents the strategic level, which influences the program level through goal 
setting, and is influenced by competitor actions in its own choices.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Overall Dynamic Systemic-Risk Model 
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As described so far, this model is a system dynamics model, albeit one operating 
at different speeds in the different levels depending on the phase of decision 
making.  The system dynamics model reflects how the individuals involved at 
different levels interact and drive each other‟s motivations and decision making. 
However, what makes this model different from a classic systems dynamics 
model is the appearance of unwanted events and competitor actions. These are 
random events, or competitor-driven events respectively, and influence the 
actions of actors at each level. Competitor action is usually most significant at 
the strategic level, influencing the perceptions of stakeholders through 
competitive actions which demand a strategic response. Unwanted events which 
we nowadays try to analyze and anticipate through risk tools. Historically these 
were a direct influence at a mission level, and only slowly filtered through to 
program level (or not at all, in the case of Darien) and higher. Nowadays, through 
modern communication and the transparency in many parts of the world, such 
events quickly become known at a higher level and are sources of immediate 
concern at both program and strategic level. Indeed, one of the main drivers of 
program risk management is the management of the way mission level events 
are interpreted by stakeholders, as they become known. 
4.5 Specific Lessons Learnt for Future Exploration 
This part of the document summarizes some of the individual lessons drawn 
from the cases. We explain each point briefly, with reference to the individual 
cases from which the point is drawn.  All is used to denote when the lesson is 
applicable to all cases. 
 “Unknown unknowns” can be converted to “known unknowns” by experience, 
but we can use information gathering to buy down uncertainty on known 
unknowns (All) 
o This arises in all the cases. For example Columbus studied the 
currents around different Atlantic islands in order to reduce 
uncertainty about departure and return directions. He had to 
encounter land before he found out that the Americas existed. 
 Some unknown unknowns remain and can be mitigated by goal change (All) 
o Columbus remained publicly convinced that he had found a route to 
Asia, but mitigated this uncertainty by concentrating on exploiting the 
lands he had discovered. 
 Goal changes are natural and can be opportunistic (Columbus, Raleigh, 
Shackleton).  
o For Columbus, the Spanish monarch shifted their goals from 
identifying a trade route to the Far East to exploitation of America. 
Raleigh shifted his goals between privateering and colonization. 
However in both cases, the strategic goal of prosperity and increased 
security remained – it was only the program goals that changed. In 
the case of Shackleton, the strategic goal was abandoned and the 
program goal became survival.  
 History judges by hindsight (Columbus, Shackleton, Apollo 13) 
Historical Exploration – Learning Lessons from the Past to Inform the Future                                       Bedford, Quigley, Revie and Walls 
 
 
Page 62                 
 
 
o With hindsight many judge the successful return of Apollo 13 to be as 
great an achievement as the landing on the moon – certainly, it has 
remained as high in public consciousness. In the case of Shackleton, 
history remembers the name of the Shackleton party but the 
successful Ross Sea party is largely unknown. Columbus is 
considered a visionary and very successful explorer when in actual 
fact he was an excellent mariner but not necessarily an excellent 
explorer.  
 Need to be wary of decisions that restrict future goal changes (Raleigh, 
Darien)  
o Both Raleigh and Darien made initial choices of location that greatly 
restricted their ability to continue the missions. Raleigh attempted to 
move location at great cost and was ultimately unsuccessful.  
 Technology heavily influences goal setting and political agenda (Franklin, 
Apollo) 
o Franklin‟s goals were set because the organizers believed that 
technology had increased to the point where they could overcome the 
environmental conditions previously encountered. The Apollo goals 
were set based on the political and technical assessment of US 
capability relative to the USSR. The International Geophysical Year 
pushed the US and USSR governments into competition in space. 
 Historically, internal risks are not causes of strategic failure (All) 
o Internal risks are problems at mission and sometimes at program 
level, but not at strategic level. 
 Competition is a principal driver for exploration (All) 
 Exploration success can be accelerated by competition (Columbus, Apollo)  
o Columbus was forced to identify a trade route to the Far East by sea 
due to the collapse of the Silk Road. In addition he had to choose a 
route that avoided the Horn of Africa because of posts set-up by the 
Portuguese. For Apollo, because the Soviet Union was able to 
achieve significant advances in the space race prior to the US, the US 
focused substantial resources on their strategic goal.  
 Lack of alignment in stakeholder and actor priorities is a contributor to 
strategic failure in colonization (Columbus, Raleigh, Darien) 
o In all three cases, what the crew had expected to be accomplished 
during the mission was not met. This was because the goals of the 
leaders and the crew were not aligned with one another. Actors, both 
leaders and crews, were acting in their own self interest and not 
meeting the strategic or program goal.  
 A potential downside of any form of collaboration is the self interest of actors 
o More opportunities for problems during colonization than exploration. 
However incentives provide means of aligning priorities but must be 
robust to future events (Columbus, Raleigh) 
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 Natural and generated in situ resources can provide substantial competitive 
advantage, e.g. choice of point of departure (Columbus, Apollo) 
o Columbus was able to leave from the Canary Isles due to the fact that 
the Spanish monarch had previously acquired the island.. The US 
had an advantage over the Soviet Union as they were able to depart 
from a site much close to the equator.  
 Failures can open up new opportunities and chances to learn (Columbus, 
Apollo) 
o In the case of Columbus, the loss of a ship on his first sortie meant 
that he had to accelerate plans for colonization. The fire of Apollo I 
meant that stricter procedures were put in place for future missions.  
 Safe havens and alternative modes offer the chance to mitigate against 
program failure when mission failure occurs (Columbus, Shackleton, Apollo 
13 as opposed to Darien) 
o Columbus was fortunate that there were abundant natural resources 
and good weather at his destination. Similarly, whilst the 
environmental conditions were difficult, Shackleton was able to find 
safe havens so he could break up his party and have greater chance 
of success. For Apollo 13, the Lunar Module acted as a safe haven 
for the crew when their primary ship, the Command and Service 
Module could no longer support them. If this failure had occurred, 
during the Apollo 8 mission where the Lunar Module was unavailable, 
the crew would not have been able to return to Earth. 
 Tangible outputs keep stakeholders happy and give credibility (Columbus as 
opposed to Cabot, Raleigh) 
 Skill of the crew to be flexible to failures and opportunities is important for 
crew survival and mission success (Shackleton, Apollo as opposed to 
Raleigh, Franklin)  
o The crew, in the case of both Shackleton and Apollo, were able to 
adapt to the difficulties they were facing   
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5 Conclusions 
This study has developed a systematic methodology for the comparison of risks 
in historical exploration campaigns ranging from Columbus to Apollo. Perhaps 
the most remarkable observation is that the only one of the cases studied that 
met its original goals was that of Apollo. However, several cases – most 
significantly Columbus - were strategic successes in spite of this. Strategic 
success entails that the campaign not only achieve its set targets, but also puts 
us in a position from which we can move further by setting and achieving future 
goals. Many early explorers were entrepreneurial and indeed opportunistic in a 
way which is difficult for modern large-scale organizations to emulate, but 
achieved success because of this.  
There are three key conclusions to this study: 
1.  Analyses of historical cases have shown that there exists a set of generic 
risk classes.  
This set of risk classes cover mission, program and strategic levels, and include 
all the risks encountered in the cases studied.  
2. There is no reason to believe that they will not be applicable to future 
exploration and colonization campaigns.  
We have deliberately selected a range of different exploration and colonization 
campaigns, taking place between the 15th Century and the 20th Century. The 
generic risk framework is able to describe the significant types of risk for these 
missions. Furthermore, many of these risks relate to how human beings interact 
and learn lessons to guide their future behavior. Although we are better schooled 
than our forebears and are technically far advanced, there is no reason to think 
we are fundamentally better on these issues. 
3. Modern risk modeling techniques are capable of addressing mission and 
program risk but are not as well suited to strategic risk.  
We have observed that strategic risks are prevalent throughout historic 
exploration and colonization campaigns. However, systematic approaches do 
not exist at the moment to analyze such risks.  
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6  Proposal for Forward Work 
The purpose of this proposal for forward work is to begin the creation of a set of 
tools for identifying and assessing strategic and programmatic risk through a 
staged process of applied development.  We propose initially to apply the results 
of the study to the current NASA exploration approach in order to qualitatively 
identify risks and possible mitigating actions. This will provide an opportunity to 
further scope future requirements on a more sophisticated tool, which could 
ultimately include simulation type methodologies, but for which would only be 
developed in a straightforward illustrative way in the first study. 
6.1 Examination of Scenarios to Identify NASA Exploration Risks 
In this section we describe the proposal for the short term future work, providing 
insight into the extension of the methodology used for the historical cases to 
examine live and prospective projects. 
6.1.1  Objectives, Deliverable and Project Phases 
The objectives of immediate forward work would be as follows: 
1. To apply the risk classification template to NASA‟s planned exploration 
campaigns to identify risks at program and strategic level. 
2. To review previous work (raised by Deborah Neubek at the final JSC 
presentation) carried out within NASA with regard to strategic risks for 
interplanetary exploration, and integrate those results into the risk model. 
3. To identify potential control mechanisms operating at program and strategic 
level in order to gain an understanding of how these might qualitatively affect 
the future course of the campaign. This requires an assessment of 
stakeholders and competitors and also of their motivations and objectives. 
4. To integrate the potential unwanted events and control mechanisms into a 
qualitative model and create qualitative scenarios for the future course of the 
campaign.  
5. Provide illustrative examples of how these scenarios can be used to inform 
decision making now and in the future. 
6. To provide reflection and discussion on how such analyses can be further 
developed.   
 
The deliverables would be:  
1. A report containing  
i. A more detailed methodology for classifying risks, unwanted events, and 
control mechanisms. 
ii. A case study based on NASA‟s current (planned) exploration program 
which qualitatively discusses how these aspects interact to form 
potential scenarios against which NASA management can consider how 
they can influence strategic decision making. 
iii. A proposal for building on the work carried out to provide the basis of a 
strategic risk assessment approach. 
2. A set of PowerPoint slides and final presentations to be made at NASA HQ 
and JSC.  
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The project would be carried out in five phases: 
1. Initial review and structuring, using existing public domain materials, such as 
the ESAS report. Identification of key NASA personnel. Comparison with 
previous NASA work on strategic risks and scenario planning. 
2. Semi-structured interviews with a number of key personnel to assess risks, 
control mechanisms and so forth. 
3. Structuring of data and creation of exploration scenarios. 
4. Workshop on scenarios to create potential response strategies. 
5. Writing final report and presentation of results. 
6.1.2 Methodology and Data Requirements 
The methodology used would be an extension of the approach used for the 
historical cases, but adapted to deal with prospective, rather than retrospective, 
projects.  Hence the innovation in the methodology would be the development of 
scenario structuring approaches that build on the retrospective analysis but 
adapt scenario planning methods to scope potential futures for the exploration 
project. 
Scenario planning assumes there is no single criterion against which decision 
alternatives can be assessed.  Alternatives have strengths and weaknesses 
which vary against different possible futures.  The premise of this methodology is 
that the future is fundamentally uncertain and that alternatives should be 
discussed in the context of several possible futures. The process of conducting 
scenario planning involves eliciting uncertainties as well as project constraints 
from relevant personnel and creating sensible sets of realizations to construct a 
few plausible futures against which alternatives can be discussed.  For example, 
Table 6.1 illustrates a simple set of scenarios for the Darien project.   
Our study has provided the outline of a systematic approach to assess and 
classify risks at a strategic level, of which the most important factors are the 
unwanted events (which may be technical, program, competitor driven, even 
stakeholder driven) and control mechanisms. The process of considering the 
scoped futures will provoke strategic discussion, raise awareness of hazards and 
threats as well as facilitate communication over time.  This in turn increases the 
ability to learn and reduces the hazards associated with false models. 
The outline approach will be further developed to provide a more detailed 
systematic classification.  The elicited data will be used to construct scenarios to 
provoke strategic discussion.  
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Table 6.1 Example Scenarios for Darien 
 England Supportive of Darien  England Destructive Towards Darien 
Darien has 
a supportive 
natural 
environment 
Assume good agriculture 
Assume Spain feels threatened 
Assume England is supportive 
through colonies 
Assume good agriculture 
Assume Spain feels threatened 
Assume England feels threatened  
Darien has 
a 
destructive 
natural 
environment 
Assume climate is poor for 
vegetation 
Assume English colonies are 
supportive 
Assume Spain feels threatened 
Assume climate is poor for vegetation 
Assume Spain feels threatened 
Assume England feels threatened 
 
The project would require inputs from a number of NASA personnel at program 
and strategic levels, as key sources of data would be from “expert judgment” 
within the program. 
6.2 Development of Simulation Tool to Analyze Strategic Exploration Risks 
Although this is not part of the immediate program for further work, we see the 
above proposals as linking in to a longer term vision of being able to model risks, 
control mechanisms and stakeholder/competitor responses through a simulation 
tool which would combine the control aspects common in System Dynamics 
modeling with the random unwanted events common in Fault tree/Event tree 
modeling. This modeling approach is called a Dynamic-Systemic risk model in 
this report. The outputs of such a model would be future sets of events and can 
be represented as risk experience diagrams. Hence a range of risk experience 
diagrams would be generated from a given model, representing possible future 
histories. As with other Monte Carlo based models, we can then calculate output 
measures such as time to program success. 
Such models, while not standard modeling tools, are not technically difficult to 
construct. However, what is not at all well understood is how a real-world 
problem can be best structured in order to inform the construction of such a tool 
for a specific case. Hence the real initial difficulties are in the creation of an 
appropriate qualitative structure, which is going to be addressed in the first stage 
of work proposed above.  Follow on work could then be focused (or re-focused, 
depending on the insights gained from the first stage) to generate other parts of 
the model and tool. 
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Appendix 1:  System Dynamics Modeling Example 
 
A simple example is provided to illustrate the concept of a qualitative systems 
dynamics model for the “chicken and egg problem” (Sterman, 2000). Figure A1.1 
shows that as more eggs are laid, more chickens are born. As more chickens 
are born, more eggs are laid. This cycle continues, reinforcing itself with the 
populations of chickens and eggs increasing.  Alternatively, if too few eggs are 
laid, then fewer chickens are born, which reinforces itself with even fewer eggs 
and chickens.  Such cycles are denoted with a “+” and referred to as virtuous or 
vicious if the results are desirable or not.  In order to manage either the 
perpetually increasing or decreasing populations, a control loop can be 
introduced. In this example, building a road crossing can provide a suitable 
control mechanism. For example, not all chickens will survive crossing the road 
and hence the population of chickens will be constrained and so reach a steady 
state. In order to change the size of population of chickens, we need to introduce 
or remove roads.  Control loops are denoted with a “-“.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference 
Sterman J.D. (2000) Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a 
Complex World, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY 
  
Figure A1.1 – Example System Dynamics Qualitative Model 
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Appendix 2: Risk Experience Diagrams 
 
The key for the Risk Experience Diagram is as follows. 
  
Risk Key 
Leadership Decisions LD  
Internal Events In   
External Events Ex   
Lack of Learning L   
Resources R 
Goal Change GC.  
Stakeholder Perception SP  
Self Interest of Actors SIA 
False Model FM 
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Figure A2.1 Risk Experience Diagram for Columbus Case Study 
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Figure A2.2 Risk Experience Diagram for Raleigh Case Study 
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Figure A2.3 Risk Experience Diagram for Darien Case Study 
  
Historical Exploration – Learning Lessons from the Past to Inform the Future                                       Bedford, Quigley, Revie and Walls 
 
 
Page 75                 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.4 Risk Experience Diagram for Franklin Case Study 
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Figure A2.5 Risk Experience Diagram for Shackleton Case Study 
 
Historical Exploration – Learning Lessons from the Past to Inform the Future                                       Bedford, Quigley, Revie and Walls 
 
 
Page 77                 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.6 Risk Experience Diagram for Apollo Case Study 
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Appendix 3: Cost Analysis 
 
In order to provide order-of-magnitude costs we have looked for estimates of the 
costs of the lost ships – on the grounds that those ships that were not lost could 
be reused.  
For Columbus, Morison () tells us that the cost of the ships for the first mission 
was 2,000,000 maravedis, and that 375 maravedis were equal to 1 gold ducat, 
or about 3.48 grams of pure gold. Since 31.11 grams is equal to one Troy ounce, 
this implies that 1 gold ducat had 0.11 fine ounces (that is pure gold Troy 
ounces). According to Measuringworth.com, the official British currency was 2.01 
pounds per fine ounce at that time. Hence, converted into British pounds of the 
time, the cost of the ships would have been around £1200, or £400 each. This 
relates to the cost of the ships only and not the payroll, which is the same order 
of magnitude again. Assuming that we only require the cost of the lost ships, we 
have total cost of £2000 (5 ships) over all the expeditions. Using the GDP 
deflator as an appropriate measure of inflation, and using the figures provided by 
Measuringworth.com, we find that the 2006 equivalent value would have been 
approximately £511,000.   
For Cabot, based on the same ship costs we obtain a figure of £408,000 
For Raleigh, Morison (1971) estimates that the cost of the colonization attempt 
was approximately £35,000. However, this does not take into account any 
money recouped through privateering. Using the GDP deflator, this is equivalent 
to £6.8M at current prices.  
For Darien we have used the costs of £400 000 (1700 prices) that are widely 
quoted, although it is not entirely clear what is covered by these costs. Using the 
GDP deflator this is equivalent to £63M at current prices. 
The costs for Franklin and Shackleton comprise the loss of ships only, i.e. two 
ships for Franklin (Erebus and Terror) and one ship for Shackleton (Endurance). 
The tonnage for Erebus was 372, Terror was 325, and Endurance was 350. The 
cost of a ship in 1850 was approximately £25 per ton, which results in a nominal 
cost of £17,425.  The cost of a ship in 1915 was £21.9 per ton, which results in a 
nominal cost of £7,665. Using the GDP deflator, we get approximate costs of 
£2M and £600,000 for Franklin and Shackleton respectively.  
In the case of Apollo we have taken total project costs. 
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